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Abstract
The report takes issue with the large debate of social security systems and
particularly the large expenditure devoted to unemployment insurance in most OECD
countries. From the perspective of transitional labour markets we analyse the
corresponding welfare regime focusing on employment and unemployment
transitions. We propose a restructuring of national social security systems towards an
employment insurance system. This entails a considerable reorganisation of most
current social security systems mainly unemployment insurance, employment
protection, pension systems, household work and life-long learning.
We advocate an integrated view of employment protection and unemployment
insurance systems which yields three major types of employment insurance systems
in the OECD (comprehensive institutional data base in Appendix). Subsequently we
discuss major recent changes in unemployment insurance systems throughout the
OECD in view of their contribution towards the development of an Employment
Insurance. Despite severe financial constraints on national levels, decentralisation
and regionalisation of provision gives a new flavour to the ambitious goal of a right to
work and its implementation.
Zusammenfassung
Der Bericht will einen Beitrag leisten zu der Reform der sozialen Sicherungssysteme.
Er befasst sich besonders mit den hohen Ausgaben für Arbeitslosenversicherungen
in den meisten OECD-Ländern. Ausgehend von der Perspektive der
Übergangsarbeitsmärkte untersuchen wir die damit verbundenen Wohlfahrtsregime
mit besonderem Blick auf Beschäftigungs- und Arbeitslosigkeitsübergänge. Wir
schlagen ein Überdenken der nationalen sozialen Sicherungssysteme im Hinblick auf
ein Beschäftigung sicherndes Gesamtsystem vor. Dies würde eine beachtliche
Reorganisation der meisten gegenwärtigen sozialen Sicherungssysteme bedeuten,
insbesondere der Arbeitslosenversicherung, des Beschäftigungsschutzes, der
Alterssicherung, der Haushaltsarbeit und des lebenslangen Lernens.
Wir befürworten eine integrierte Betrachtung von Beschäftigungsschutz und
Arbeitslosenversicherungssystemen; daraus ergeben sich drei Haupttypen von
Beschäftigung sichernden Systemen in der OECD (umfangreiche institutionelle
Datenbank im Anhang). Darüber hinaus werden wichtige Veränderungen der
Arbeitslosenversicherungssysteme in den letzten Jahren in der OECD diskutiert,
besonders im Hinblick auf ihren Beitrag zur Entwicklung eines Beschäftigung
sichernden Sozialsystems. Trotz erheblicher finanzieller Engpässe auf nationaler
Ebene konnten Dezentralisierung und Regionalisierung dazu beitragen, dem
anspruchsvollen Ziel des Rechts auf Arbeit und seiner Verwirklichung eine neue
Bedeutung zu geben.
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1 Introduction
The World Labour Report 1999 is devoted to the theme “Income security in a
changing world”. The industrialised countries can reasonably be expected to have
the longest traditions of a formalised system of some elements of income security1.
But even within these industrialised countries the extend of income security and the
kind of support which is provided vary a great deal. There is neither a political, nor a
scientific consensus among Member States of the OECD what the right level of
unemployment protection or the optimal coverage for systems like unemployment
insurance or employment protection should be (Holmlund, 1998). The answer to the
question probably depends on the scope such a system of support and solidarity is
intended to have.
The earliest forms of unemployment insurance were developed by trade unions
in the nineteenth century in Britain and Sweden, but largely restricted to specific
professions. Attempts to broaden the coverage soon led to the involvement of
employers and the state. The broadest scope of such an insurance is captured in a
system which covers the whole working-age population. More narrow income support
systems only focus on the economically active population thus shifting the scope of
solidarity from the society at large to those who have already contributed to economic
production. These are typically income support systems which are build on previous
contributions of potential recipients, which have been coined Bismarckian systems of
social security. In contrast, social security systems based on generalised income
support have been named Beveridge-type social assistance.
These two major forms of social protection developed in the late 19th century
and refer to different conceptions of the Welfare state and social needs, in
particularly concerning unemployment. On the one hand, the British system, created
by William Beveridge, was the first one (in 1911) to recognise unemployment as a
social risk, which should be covered with an insurance. This first nation-wide
unemployment insurance was regarded as an instrument of labour market regulation
able to stabilise the wage-earning social class. In ”Social Insurance and Allied
Services” of 1942, Beveridge took up this reasoning and applied it to other social
risks, such as health, retirement and family related obligations. The social protection
system is based on three principles: universality, unity and uniformity. It tends to
cover the whole population with (modest) insurance benefits. The initial idea was to
maintain social stability through a minimum income which also allows a sustained
demand for goods and services important for macro-economic stabilisation. The
                                           
1
 Less formalised systems of income security are narrow or extended family, household or
neighbourhood support for living expenses or income. These elements are dealt with in other parts
of the World Labour Report 1999. Therefore, we restrict our in depth analysis more to the
comparison of unemployment insurance and employment protection systems in this report to avoid
overlaps.
2great influence of Keynes’ economic  theory in the elaboration of the British model of
social protection leads to the fact that social difficulties are regarded simultaneously
with economic difficulties.
On the other hand, the Bismarckian model of social protection is based on socio-
professional solidarity and insurance funds, co-financed from workers’ and
employers’ contributions. It was created by Bismarck as part of a whole system of
social protection starting in 1881 for professional risks and ranges to 1927 for the
unemployment insurance system. Due to co-financing structure of these funds the
social partners, trade unions and employers’ organisations, share the management
of these funds usually with the State in a tripartite form. The Bismarckian-type of
unemployment insurance differs from the Beveridge design of social protection in the
coverage of the population. The universality of benefits cannot be achieved in the
former system because the insurance principle demands some period of contribution
before any insurance benefits can be claimed. Typically this excludes young labour
market entrants who have not yet worked and contributed to the funds. Therefore,
unemployment insurance is usually complemented by some form of social assistance
for persons not eligible for benefits of unemployment insurance. Those two models of
social protection have served as basic examples for many countries which developed
unemployment insurance or unemployment benefits as major pillar of  social
protection.
With this sketch of the historical evolution of social protection we have already
identified the major distinguishing elements of all forms of unemployment protection
also nowadays. These are the level and duration of wage replacements, and the
question of how many persons have access to insurance or protection claims. In
other words, who is covered under this individual, group or social contract. Recent
economic and social policy debates still deal with these basic issues: (1) Is there
scope to increase the level of coverage to larger groups of society and (2) can the
existing levels of benefits and the extend of coverage be kept at the current levels?
In this chapter we discuss country experiences with unemployment insurance
and employment protection for the employed in the wider framework of more general
welfare provision. Only briefly we touch additional elements of social assistance,
financing of retirement, occupational disabilities and compensation for household
activities like caring for children or the elderly2. These elements are mentioned to
exemplify the perspective of transitional labour markets (Schmid, 1998; Schmid,
Gazier, Flechtner, 1999) and because they constitute important functional
equivalents of employment protection and unemployment insurance from the benefit
                                           
2
 Chapters six and eight of the World Labour Report 1999 cover these aspects in detail. Useful
material on retirement and disability pensions can be found in the OECD Employment Outlook
1998 which illustrates the close link of employment protection to retirement and occupational
disability compensations. An analysis of the dynamics of early retirement in the European Union
based on the transitional labour markets approach can be found in Kruppe, Oschmiansky and
Schömann (1999). For a comparative analysis of family support systems and the treatment of
marriage and children in European Income Tax Systems compare O’Donoghue and Sutherland
1998.
3recipient’s point of view as well as for the legislator. Sometimes these other elements
of social protection provide alternative or even complementary sources of income in
labour market transitions. A detailed investigation of the multiple links of these other
support systems with employment protection and unemployment insurance are,
however, beyond the scope of this chapter.
We make a particular effort to link the discussion of unemployment insurance
systems with the controversies about employment protection. Although employment
protection concerns only those who already hold a job it has a role to play in the
prevention of unemployment by means of offering advance notice of individual
dismissal or mass redundancies. Similarly, severance pay at separations of
employers and employees is also conceived to provide income support during the
following labour market transition. Rather than extending the thorough economic and
social analysis of employment protection by Schömann, Rogowski, Kruppe (1998) for
the European Union to the OECD countries, we restrict the analysis to a more
general overview of the “state of the art” focussing on the kind of relationship
between unemployment insurance and employment protection in the Member States
of the OECD.
According to the broad view of income security taken in the World Labour
Review we shall provide in Section two a general framework for the analysis of
income, employment protection and unemployment insurance. Section three
introduces a distinction into high, medium and growing types of unemployment
insurance and employment protection systems. Section four relates recent trends in
employment and unemployment to institutional features of employment insurance.
Recent policy responses are discussed in Section 5. The conclusions concerning
employment insurance as an integrating form of unemployment insurance and
employment protection are presented in the final Section six.
42 Transitional labour markets as a framework for comparisons
Derived from a systemic overview of all labour market transitions, Schmid (1998)
distinguishes five types of transitional labour markets: (1) transitions between part-
time and full-time employment, between dependent and self-employment (2)
transitions between unemployment and employment, (3) transitions between
education/training and employment, (4) transitions between private household and
labour market activity, (5) transitions between employment and retirement. These
employment bridges can be trespassed in both directions, in some cases even
several times within a year (compare Figure 1).
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Transitional Labour Markets
The theory of transitional labour markets recognises that, basically, all labour market
flows can occur in both directions: outflows from unemployment are linked to inflows
into unemployment. A narrowly defined unemployment insurance system which
5focuses only on flows between unemployment and employment is likely to overlook
the fact that the flows into unemployment can also come either directly from the
education system or from people previously labelled economically inactive but
providing important services to households and society as a whole (Schömann,
Kruppe, Oschmiansky 1998). The link between unemployment insurance and
employment protection, viewed from the perspective of the theory of transitional
labour markets, becomes apparent in the following policy example. Employment
policies directed at facilitating the outflow from unemployment by deregulating fixed-
term employment has only limited success, because the increase in fixed-term
employment also has the effect of increasing the inflows into unemployment, as
short-term employment contracts expire (Schömann, Rogowski, Kruppe, 1998). The
change in unemployment level is always a reflection of the difference between both
these flows.
The framework provided by the theory of transitional labour markets is useful to
understand the multiple links and overlaps between different types of income support
systems. Based on national systems of unemployment insurance and employment
protection we can derive a combined perspective of protection against
unemployment in OECD countries (see also Auer 1999; Bertola et al. 1999; Boeri,
1999). These two elements constitute the focus or kernel of what we define as an
employment insurance system since both systems (employment protection and
unemployment insurance) deal with societal responses to the risk of unemployment.
However, other income support systems like pensions for disability or general
retirement and early retirement have more and more taken the role of substituting
unemployment benefits at later phases during the life course (Casey, 1996; OECD,
1998).
Similarly, the transitional labour market between private household activities,
mostly unpaid work, and labour market activity is subject to increased labour market
policy attention due to increasing efforts to ensure equal opportunities for women and
men to participate fully in the labour market. Some features of the income tax
system, the health insurance system, particularly if they grant specific rights for
spouses or dependent children, as well as maternity leave parental and educational
leave regulations operate as functionally equivalent support systems (compare
Figure 2) to elements of unemployment insurance systems. Perhaps in the case of
maternity leave it is most obvious that unpaid household activities coincide with
special employment protection legislation which guards against dismissal around the
expected date of birth. Each of the transitional labour markets two to five (Figure 1) is
closely linked to the regulation of the general labour market be it dependent
employment or self employment, full time or part time employment, or fixed-term
versus more permanent types of employment. The insurance type of income support
systems which correspond to each transitional labour market have been depicted as
each forming a separate sphere which overlap in sphere of the general labour market
(compare Figure 2).
6It is, however, beyond the scope of this chapter to give a full account of the many
ways in which subsidies devoted to household activities affect labour market
outcomes. Besides some basic features of the income tax system like joint, separate
and transferable taxation of households or couples (Pechman, Engelhardt, 1990), tax
reductions for day-care expenditure or child benefits (Gustafsson, 1996) which may
constitute functional equivalents to low-paid part-time work for spouses, maternity
leave is usually considered an element of employment protection legislation. In terms
of income support and work incentives both areas have a close relationship as
illustrated in Figure 2.
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From Unemployment Insurance
to Employment Insurance
A final example is mentioned to demonstrate the use of a broad perspective on
income security. Therefore, we consider the common case of further training for the
employed or the unemployed which are traditionally organised by public employment
services and financed or co-financed through unemployment insurance. Initiatives
under the overarching title of life-long learning largely supported by the specialised
organisations of the United Nations (ILO, IMF, UNESCO, World Bank) and OECD
have stressed the link and implications for a reform of the general education system
7which needs to be re-opened for this kind of second chance education with a closer
link to the labour market.
The driving force for this new link between the general and vocational education
system and employment insurance consists in the rapid development of new skills
and competences necessary for success in the labour market (Tuijnman, Schömann,
1996). Previously both systems were considered as separate entities, but successful
employment insurance systems facilitate the transitions also between the world of
learning and working throughout life. The Danish educational leave schemes not only
allow such transitions but give additionally financial incentives to realise more
frequent transitions. Canadian and Japanese initiatives of a comprehensive
employment insurance system are closely connected to life-long learning initiatives
(OECD 1998, Japan Institute of Labour 1999) to mention only a few examples.
We cannot give a full account of the multiple links between the different support
systems. Our general framework is meant to serve as a safeguard against
necessarily reductionist representations of national employment systems and their
respective overall welfare state arrangements. The institutional data base developed
for this purpose (see appendix 1) serves as background information for more detailed
comparisons of only selected specific features of an individual country’s employment
insurance system.
As a first step to reduce the complexity formed by the multiple institutional links
between the different support systems we will introduce three broad country groups
that have similar features concerning their unemployment insurance and employment
protection systems.
83 Main types of unemployment insurance and employment
protection systems
Within the OECD unemployment protection systems vary substantially. There is no
agreed ideal type of unemployment insurance or employment protection in OECD
member states. In contrast each country has built its own system with its own specific
national features. However, we can distinguish main types of unemployment
protection systems in the OECD if we focus on some general and important aspects.
For analysing some common factors we mainly concentrate on financial and
temporal aspects, the coverage ratio of the unemployment insurance system and the
main aspects of employment protection legislation. This approach has been chosen
in order to reveal the most relevant configurations concerning the unemployment
insurance and employment protection systems in the OECD.
3.1 Methodological approach and indicators
The categories connected with our analysis of unemployment insurance focus on
four criteria: first, the level of unemployment benefits, second, the duration of
unemployment benefit payments, third, the coverage with unemployment insurance
as a percentage of all unemployed persons and, fourth, the strictness of the
employment protection legislation3.
Corresponding to our comparative view we have to rely on sources that provide
comparable information about the chosen variables. As an indicator for the level of
employment benefits, we have selected the net replacement rates for single
unemployed compiled by the OECD (1997a, 17ff.). This indicator provides a
comprehensive picture of the real average benefits the unemployed are receiving.
This is because not only tax payments and social security contributions are deducted
from the benefit calculation. In addition a few important alternative sources of
income, i.e. housing benefits, family or child benefits, food stamps, clothing, and
social assistance are incorporated in the estimations. The specific indicator that we
used is the net replacement rate for a single average production worker in the first
month after the unemployment spell.4
Additional information about the level of compensation the unemployed are
receiving can be derived from the level of social assistance (see appendix 1). Social
assistance serves as a last source of income when other sources of unemployment
                                           
3 For a more detailed description of the criteria underlying the categories see appendix 2.
4 The average net replacement rate is calculated at national average earnings referring to a
production worker being 40 years old and having worked continuously since the age of 18.
Replacement rates are for the first month of unemployment after waiting period have been met
(OECD,1997, 23, Table 5).
9benefits are unavailable. The international comparison of this indicator shows that the
countries with a high level of regular unemployment compensation and
unemployment assistance usually have a high level of social assistance and vice
versa. This high correlation between the two indicators lead us to concentrate the
analysis on the net replacement rates of unemployment compensation payments.
The second indicator is the maximum duration of unemployment compensation
payment. Since the structure of unemployment compensation schemes vary to a
great extent between the OECD countries, we had to apply additional restrictions.
The main difference is the existence or non-existence of an two-step unemployment
compensation scheme, consisting of ‘unemployment insurance’ and ‘unemployment
assistance’ payments (see Schmid, Reissert, 1996). Our decision is to include the
duration of unemployment assistance payments in the calculation of the overall
duration of unemployment compensation if the level of payment is substantially
higher than the level of social assistance benefits. We excluded it if for example in
the United Kingdom the unemployment assistance payments are on the level of the
social assistance payments5.
The coverage of benefit denotes the proportion of unemployed receiving
unemployment compensation, also called ‘beneficiary rates’ (Schmid, Reissert,
1996). In addition to the depth of effectiveness of unemployment insurance this
indicator reflects the tightness of a system concerning eligibility and work availability
provisions as well as the proportion of long-term unemployed who exhausted the
unemployment insurance payments. Another measure for coverage more focussing
on the transition from employment to unemployment (compare Figure 1) would be
the proportion of employed being insured by the unemployment insurance system.
Due to the lack of comparable information we had to neglect this aspect.
Regarding the indicator for employment protection we again focussed on
comparable data provided by various sources and compiled to an index measuring
the strictness of employment protection legislation in OECD countries (OECD,
1994a,b ; OECD 1999c). This index covers different aspect of employment protection
legislation such as statutory notice periods, procedural inconveniences, the level of
severance pay and rules governing unfair dismissal (OECD, 1994a, b, pp. 69-73).
The indicator reflects the state of the employment protection legislation at the end of
the 80ies and thus does not include changes in that area during the 90ies.
Nevertheless we decided to include this indicator in our analysis because of its
comprehensive nature, the coverage of a large number of OECD countries and its
statistical usability. In addition comparison with recent studies (Bertola, Boeri, Cazes,
1999) show that the relations between the countries concerning employment
protection legislation do not change considerably, strengthening the notion that
legally fixed institutional frameworks are subject to a relatively slow change
(Buechtemann, 1993; Schömann, Rogowski, Kruppe, 1998).6
                                           
5 See Appendix 2 for more information.
6 This notion has been confirmed by a recent OECD-publication of newly compiled EPL-indicators
covering changes until the end of the 90ies (OECD 1999c). It show that the correlation between
10
Due to the lack of readily assessable and comparable information on regulations
based on collective agreements signed by the social partners we had to confine our
comparison to these legislative regulations as an important part of general labour
law. Nevertheless this is a severe shortcoming since in some legislative traditions
collective agreements play a more important role than the general worker statutes
referred to in labour legislation (Schömann, Rogowski, Kruppe, 1998)7. To capture
some of these additional aspects of employment protection, we comprised an
indicator about the proportion of fixed term contracts in the employment systems, the
collective bargaining coverage rate and the trade union density (see appendix 1).
The indicator for fixed term contracts contains ambivalent information that
prevents a cross-sectional comparison of the OECD countries on the proportion of
fixed term contracts. Because of the different regulations concerning regular
employment contracts in the OECD countries, the demand for signing fixed term is
very heterogeneous. This constellation prohibits a direct comparison without
additional information. E.g. a comparison between the proportion of fixed term
contract between the USA and Germany is purposeless, whereas a comparison
between Spain and France gives a deep inside into the specific features of the
Spanish employment system concerning fixed term contracts. In this article the
indicator for the proportion of fixed term contracts in the OECD countries serves as a
complementary information on employment systems and permits a comparison within
one group of countries with the approximately the same level of employment
protection legislation.
On the basis of the four main indicators level of unemployment compensations,
duration of unemployment compensation, strictness of employment protection
legislation and coverage, the analysis of the unemployment insurance and
employment protection systems has led to the construction of clusters of systems of
unemployment protection. As the appropriate statistical technique to classify the
OECD countries we applied cluster analysis using statistical techniques such as
hierarchical clustering methods (Norušis, 1992).8 Following the results of the cluster
analysis we constructed three broad clusters that gather countries showing similar
characteristics concerning the chosen indicators. We call these country clusters the
high level, the medium level and the growing type of unemployment protection
because it shows that the clusters are characterised by a high, medium and growing
level of unemployment insurance and employment protection. The distribution of the
OECD countries to these broad clusters is depicted in Figure 3. The clustering
                                                                                                                                       
the country-ranking at the end of the 80ies and at the end of the 90ies is as high as 0.86 (OECD
1999c: 67.
7 In the Scandinavian countries the unemployment insurance funds are mainly administered by
trade unions although largely co-financed by the state budget. As soon as the comparison is
oriented towards specific industrial sectors the role of collective agreements becomes even more
important in all countries. The deviation of sectoral agreements from national legislation is
particularly strong in the U.S. or Denmark for example were the general legislative level of
regulation is kept at a low level of employment protection, but sectors or individual firms do opt for
a substantially more restrictive levels of dismissal protection.
8 See Appendix 2 for more information.
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scheme which we applied also allows for two kinds of intermediate clusters. The
following sections will discuss the characteristics of the three major types of
unemployment protection systems.
Figure 3
Main Types of Unemployment Insurance Systems
in OECD countries
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3.2 The high level type
The high level type pools the most generous unemployment protection systems
within the OECD9, namely Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Iceland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and
Switzerland.
In high level type countries unemployment protection consists of various layers
of benefits10. Unemployment insurance benefits (UB) as the first and most important
layer are paid during an initial period of unemployment. Following the insurance
principle the amount and in most cases the duration of unemployment insurance
benefits depends on level (and duration) of previous earnings. With average net
replacement rates11 of more than 60 per cent of the respective national average
earnings, the level of unemployment benefits within the high level type lies
                                           
9 In this context ‘generous’ means that the employment protection legislation and the unemployment
insurance-system offer a high standard of financial security for the working population in case of
unemployment spells.
10 See Schmid, Reissert, 1996 and Gazier, Schmid, Flechtner (1999 forthcoming).
11 See Footnote 4 and appendix 1.
12
significantly over the average rate of the medium level type countries12. Additionally
most high level systems13 do dispose of a second layer of unemployment insurance,
usually called unemployment assistance (UA)14. Unemployment assistance in high
level type-systems prevents unemployed workers having exhausted their entitlement
to unemployment benefits of falling directly into the less generous social assistance
schemes. Acting as the final layer of unemployment insurance (also open for all
persons in need), social assistance benefits or guaranteed minimum income (GMI)
schemes play an important role for unemployed not qualifying for or having already
exhausted their entitlement to unemployment benefits. Concerning social assistance
high level type-systems are generous as in all countries of the high level group social
assistance is of unlimited duration and the respective benefit levels are rather high
compared with those of the other OECD countries15.
Besides the level the duration of unemployment insurance benefits is equally
important for assessing the generosity of unemployment protection. High level
systems are characterised by long duration of payments. All high level
unemployment insurance systems pay benefits for at least one year16, in most cases
even significantly longer. Furthermore the coverage ratio within high level type
countries is comparatively high. In most countries more than 60 per cent of all
unemployed are covered by unemployment insurance17. On the one hand this high
ratios are partly consequence of the above mentioned long-term entitlements to
unemployment insurance, partly a result of moderate unemployment insurance
qualifying conditions. On the other hand the fact that the majority of the unemployed
in high level countries does actually benefit from unemployment insurance
underlines, inversely, the relevance of the generous financial aspects of these benefit
schemes.
Having presented the main characteristics of unemployment insurance systems
within the high level group we shall now take a look on employment protection
legislation. Concerning this criteria the high level type is a slightly more
heterogeneous group. While most countries - especially Portugal, Germany, Spain,
Belgium and Finland - impose strong limitations on the freedom of business to hire
and fire18, employment protection legislation in Switzerland and Denmark seems little
                                           
12 The unweighted average of the Medium level type is at 38,8 per cent.
13 This is not the case in Belgium, Denmark, Iceland, Luxembourg and Norway.
14 In contrast to the first layer, unemployment assistance benefits are means-tested and flat-rated
(except for the case of Germany).
15
 Most high level type systems offer a net replacement rate of social assistance of more than 45 per
cent of the respective national average earnings for a single person (OECD 1994b; appendix 1,
column 2.7).
16 See appendix 1 (II.4.for unemployment assistance).
17 The coverage criterion for High Standard systems is not achieved by France (44 per cent) , the
Netherlands (50 per cent), Luxembourg (33 per cent), Portugal (25 per cent) and Spain (21 per
cent); Unfortunately, comparable data for coverage is only available for European Union member
states (no data for Iceland, Norway and Switzerland) (appendix 1, column 2.5).
18 According to the OECD ranking these countries have an EPL-index of above 10 (the OECD EPL-
indexes range between 0 and 15) (appendix 1).
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constrained19. However one should pay attention to the fact that this OECD-based
rating reflects only legal arrangements. The high level group would probably appear
more homogeneously if it would be possible to include other aspects of non-legal
agreements or fixed-term contracts in a systematic way. For example the high EPL
index of Spain is put into a new perspective if one considers that about one third of
the Spanish employees is working on the basis of fixed-term contracts and are
therefore not covered by most EPL-arrangements. Inversely Denmark’s weak EPL-
index neglects the role of arrangements based on agreements between the social
partners that are at least relevant for more than half of the Danish employees20.
Finally, in spite of its rather broad range, employment protection legislation within the
High Level category is still stricter than in most other industrialised countries.
Thus summarising the above presented criteria we conclude that within the
OECD member states the high level type countries are characterised by an above
average generosity in unemployment protection, namely by high level and long
duration of unemployment insurance benefit payments, extensive unemployment
insurance coverage and an additional layer of employment protection legislation
aiming at the prevention of unemployment. By means of six indicators a graphical
presentation of the high level type is depicted in Figure 4 showing the large area of
the unemployment protection safety net obtained in these countries.
Figure 4
Unemployment Protection Indicators
 - selected High Level Type-systems
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**Conversion: OECD-Index 15 = 1 
                                           
19 The OECD-index is 3,25 for Denmark and 1,75 for Switzerland.
20 For assessing the impact of agreements of social partners we have thus included an index
reflecting the coverage of collective bargaining in the graphical representation below. The data are
bases on the ILO World Labour Report 1997-98 (see appendix 1).
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3.3 The medium level type
Medium level countries have well established unemployment protection systems with
a long tradition just as the systems of the high level countries. But in general
unemployment protection arrangements within the medium type throughout all
relevant aspects are less generous than those of the high level type systems. The
United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom form the
country cluster of medium level type-systems.
Concerning unemployment insurance all medium level systems provide some
kind of unemployment benefit but there is no second layer of unemployment
insurance in the form of unemployment assistance schemes. The level of
unemployment benefits are lower than within the high level type, with net
replacement rates ranging from 23 per cent (New Zealand) to 58 per cent (USA,
Canada) of the respective average national earnings. In addition unemployment
benefits in Australia and New Zealand do not follow the insurance principle but are
unlimited, means-tested and based on a flat rate of wage replacement. Concerning
the rather low level of benefits, unemployment insurance in these two countries is
thus following more the tradition of social assistance. In the other medium level
systems the periods of unemployment benefits payments are rather short, with a
maximum length of benefits payments of less than 12 months. Furthermore the
coverage of unemployment insurance in the medium level type is more limited than in
the high level type21. Social assistance schemes within the Medium level type -
though open to all persons in need - are not as generous as in the case of the high
level countries. Except for Great Britain net replacement rates of social assistance for
singles do not exceed 45 per cent within the medium type.
According to the employment protection legislation ranking of the OECD22 legal
arrangements in medium level type countries are supposed to provide little or no
statutory employment protection. As hiring and firing practises in these countries are
scarcely constrained by law one should also consider the possible impact of
collective arrangements signed by the social partners. However, in contrast to the
case of Denmark and Switzerland, such arrangements can not be expected to
reinforce the overall employment protection as in all medium level countries (with the
exception of Australia) only a minority of employees are covered by collective
bargaining. In addition the density - and therefore presumably also the impact - of
trade unions have sharply declined in most medium level countries23. For example, in
New Zealand trade unions have lost more than half of their members between 1984
and 1994. Thus concluding employment protection in all medium level type systems
has to be rated as weak.
                                           
21 Comparable data is only available for Great Britain with a coverage of 59%, coverage in the United
States is estimated at 40 per cent, in Canada coverage has declined from 83 per cent in 1990 to
recently 42 per cent (due to tightened unemployment insurance qualifying conditions). No data is
available for Australia and New Zealand (see appendix1).
22 EPL indexes of the Medium type group range from 0,36 (USA) to 3,26 (AUS), see appendix 1.
23 Only in Canada density has been stable at about 37 per cent.
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Summarising the level of unemployment protection in the Medium type one find
that all countries in this category do dispose of unemployment insurance and
employment protection systems. Concerning the overall unemployment protection
those systems provide a level of generosity that can be assessed as medium within
the OECD context. Judging from the information on the overall social safety net for
the unemployed (compare Figure 5) income support for the unemployed is somewhat
lower in this type as in the High level group.
Figure 5
Unemployment Protection Indicators
 - selected Medium Level Type-systems
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3.4 The growing type
The growing type is formed by the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Korea, Mexico
and Turkey. Within the OECD these countries do significantly mark off the other
types of unemployment protection as they do not dispose of well established systems
of unemployment protection and existing regulations and arrangements are subject
to rapid changes. In addition all Growing type countries except for Turkey have just
recently joined the OECD. This brings along a severe problem of lack of comparable
data and impedes an analysis solely restricted to the statistical indicators used for the
distinction of the high and medium level type. Nevertheless there are some more
detailed features concerning unemployment insurance and employment protection.
An unemployment insurance systems does not yet exist in Turkey and Mexico
and was recently created in Korea (in 1995). In the Czech Republic, Hungary and
Poland unemployment insurance has undergone sharp changes due to the
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transformation process within the former socialist countries. In growing type countries
where unemployment insurance systems exist duration and level24 of benefit
payments as well as the coverage are rather limited. Concerning the strength of
employment protection legislation information is rare25 and due to the complexity of
this indicator difficult to assess. However we suppose that EPL will be stronger in the
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland than in the other countries of the Growing type
because of their socialist past and their orientation towards the European Union26.
Since unemployment protection in all growing type systems are lacking fix or
established structures their direction of development is hard to assess. For example
after the breakdown of the socialist regimes East European OECD countries
experienced a period of sharp cuts in their national social security systems. Yet it is
not clear if they will tend towards the high level type of unemployment protection of
their European neighbours (which seems probable if they will join the European
Union in the medium term) or if they will rather orient on the more liberal models of
the Medium type systems. Concluding one should pay attention to the fact that all
growing type countries are still in the process of building up an unemployment
protection system and can reasonably be expected to close up to the medium or
even high level countries in the medium term.
3.5 Intermediate type I and type II:
The clusters of OECD countries (compare Figure 3) contain two intermediate types of
unemployment protection systems that can not be clearly assigned to one of the
three main types. On the one hand Japan and Ireland (intermediate type I) are
situated between the high and the medium level type. On the other hand Italy and
Greece are representing the intermediate type II.
Intermediate type I: According to the indicators used in our analysis Japan and
Ireland do dispose of characteristics both of the medium and the high level type. With
an average net replacement rate of 63 per cent Japan's unemployment benefit level
is among those of the high level group. However, concerning duration and coverage
of unemployment insurance Japan does clearly fall in the medium type category.
Finally Japans EPL index is slightly higher than the standard of the medium type.
Inversely in Ireland the level of unemployment benefit payments is rather low but
those benefits are paid for more than one year and are additionally complemented by
an unemployment assistance scheme. While the coverage of the Irish unemployment
insurance system is far above the average of the medium type systems its EPL index
corresponds to this category. Applying our analysis' indicators we see that neither
                                           
24 As there are yet no data of net replacement rates we had to confine to indicators as gross
replacement rates.
25
 Until now none of the growing type countries turns up in the EPL-rankings of the OECD (nor in
rankings of other authors).
26 For example Hungary recently harmonised their regulations concerning collective dismissals  with
relevant EU directives.
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Japan nor Ireland can be clearly assigned to the high or medium level type. Aside
from these empirical factors we did not find stringent clues to decide whether these
countries will develop in the direction of the medium or the high level type. Those
arguments justify their intermediate position in our clusters.
Intermediate type II: Empirically Greece and Italy provide a level of unemployment
protection that in most aspects is near to the growing type. While employment
protection legislation is very strong, unemployment insurance arrangements are
considerably below the standard of the high level countries27. Nevertheless and in
contrast to all other Growing type countries both Italy and Greece dispose of
established unemployment protection systems with long traditions. Furthermore
within the last decade both countries have remarkably expanded their unemployment
insurance systems in favour of the unemployed28. Besides the placing of the two
countries is justified by another argument. Due to their involvement in the European
Union we suppose that concerning unemployment protection Italy and Greece are
already and will continue to develop in the direction of their European partners and
will thus close up to the high standard systems in the medium term.
Figure 6
Unemployment Protection Indicators 
- Intermediate Type I-systems
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27 An exception is the duration of the Greek unemployment insurance system that evenly qualifies
with an maximum duration of payments of 12 months.
28 Italy increased UI benefits (from 20 to 30 per cent of previous earnings) and also expanded the
access to those benefits. Besides, a more comfortable wage compensation fund (CIG) have been
created for the case of mass redundancies within large enterprises. Greece has also risen the
level of UI benefits as well as extended the maximum duration of UI.
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3.6 Legal sources of a right to work as an element in the explanation of the
typology
The legal concept of a right to work, which is the right to obtain the means of a
suitable standard of living through work, has a close relationship to both social
protection systems especially unemployment insurance and employment protection.
To a large extent the commitment of state-level action towards poverty, social
exclusion and social integration is predetermined by the level at which a right to work
is determined within a country’s legal framework. It needs to be mentioned that the
right to work is frequently linked also to an obligation to work which enhances the
possibility to carry out “active” work-fare programmes based on the same legal
source or activation of public expenditure on labour market policies more generally.
For this purpose we provide a brief overview of (1) the legal rank of the right to
work, (2) if it exists in an explicit form and (3) whether the legal basis obliges the
state to act in order to provide citizens with employment. The rank of a legal
assertion of a right to work for example in a constitution, which can be changed only
with a qualifying majority (usually higher than simple majority rule) is indicative of a
state’s commitment for both employment protection and income support with the aim
of reintegration through employment into the labour market. It also refers to the role
of the state to regulate the labour market, and at least historically to which extent a
far reaching “monopoly” in social matters exists. Only recently we witness the
abolition of public employment service monopolies in the realm of placement services
or employment agencies.
Generally, the highest legal rank to assess a right is the constitution of a State,
which contains both principles and rights. Principles have a high moral value without
normative effect. Rights, on the other hand, have to be implemented by means of law
or agreements or other types of legal instruments that have a normative effect. In this
respect, a constitutional right for citizens is a duty for the State. It is important to
determine the nature of this state duty in a comparison. In case a constitutional right
to work exists, the State can reasonably be expected to make larger efforts to
provide jobs for unemployed persons that correspond to their level of qualifications.
However, the question, can the state force job seekers to take up any (low paid) job
or labour market policy measure, remains to be investigated as well. Another
interpretation of a constitutional right to work is that the State needs to take legal
action to advance the implementation of the right, for example, through active labour
market policies coupled with a sufficiently large social protection, so that job seekers
who still don’t find work can have a reasonable standard of living. This latter
understanding of a constitutional right to work is the most common one encountered
in the comparison of the constitutions of OECD countries.
A number of OECD countries do not have a constitutional right to work. Among
them two categories can be distinguished. On the one hand we find the countries
having a constitution, but no right to work as a constitutional guarantee for its citizen
such as Germany and Switzerland and, on the other hand, we find countries that
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don’t have a written constitution, such as Great Britain. In both instances, however, a
social protection and in particular an unemployment protection system exists, so that
job seekers and unemployed persons have access to active labour market policies or
(passive) social assistance. In theses cases, the reasons of the non existence of a
(constitutional) right to work have historical and political roots, which do not imply no
responsibility or even an unwillingness of the part of the state to act against exclusion
or poverty. Commitment to the right to work can also be inferred from expenditure on
active labour market policies through unemployment insurance systems as well as
legally determined employment protection in form of statutory dismissal protection
(Buechtemann, 1993; Schömann, Rogowski, Kruppe, 1998, see also Section 5 of this
chapter).
Comparative analyses of the existence of a constitutional right to work in the
OECD countries show a high degree of similarity with the comparative analysis of
types of unemployment protection systems in these countries, in particular with the
proposed classification. Countries classified in the medium level type of
unemployment protection systems do not have a constitution or right to work of
constitutional rank (compare Table 1). A reason for this finding can be found in the
type of legal system a country has adopted. The great influence of the British legal
system, which does not have a written constitution and where written social rights
play a subordinate role explains historically the lack of constitutional social rights
such as a right to work, in Australia, New Zealand, The United States, Canada and
Mexico.
Countries with a legal system based on a constitution implement the existence of
a constitutional right to work, in form of a binding obligation for the State to create job
opportunities for job applicants (like in Turkey and Portugal) or in form of a norm of
public order to be implemented by Government action. This is the case in most
countries having a high or a growing level type of unemployment insurance system.
The fact that a constitutional right to work exists in both types of unemployment
insurance systems does not allow to reach a simple conclusion. Moreover, a more
thorough historical and political analysis of the transition economies of Eastern
Europe is indicated to inform the status of the right to work in these societies during
or after the transition from the socialist past.
It is common legal practice that recent constitutions of a country acknowledge
the existence and extent of a right to work through references to international legal
sources due to their normative impact on national law. The ratification of international
agreements by countries expresses the will to adopt these principles and to
implement them in their own legal system. However, internationally ratified
agreements have a limited constraining effect, because of lack of dissuasive penalty
mechanisms. A range of ILO agreements are concerned with active labour market
policies, the International Pact of economic, social and cultural rights from 1966
mentions in article 6 the right to work as a fundamental principle for a full
employment policy, the universal declaration of human rights contains a right to work,
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women of
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1979 asserts the right to work, as a right inherent in the human person which needs
to be implemented for everyone and the European Social Charter of 1961, completed
in 1988, contains a range of individual rights among them a right to work in article 1.
The information contained in Table 1 lends support to the clustering approach of
countries into three major types of unemployment protection systems as depicted in
Figure 3. Despite the relatively clear cut distinction of legal traditions between
medium and high level countries, it is noteworthy that both intermediate type groups
of Ireland, Japan as well as Greece and Italy do have a constitutional assurance of a
right to work. The delineation of the high level group corresponds for these countries
to their legal tradition similar to most other countries in the high level group.
In the following section four we discuss recent trends in unemployment in the
Member States of the OECD with respect to the three broad clusters of
unemployment protection systems outlined above. We base our analysis, due to data
restrictions, mainly on indicators of stocks of unemployed persons although an
analysis of flows into and out of unemployment would be more adequate (Schömann,
Kruppe, 1996). Yet the main conclusions of our overview in this chapter are not
altered if one or the other source of data is applied29. The country clusters derived
above are useful in understanding the working of labour market institutions and
constitutions, the explanation of recent trends in levels of unemployment, however, is
even more complex since sometimes longer run economic cycles and structural
imbalances affect recent levels of unemployment.
                                           
29 This holds true only for a comparison of the Member States of the European Union until 1995
where we had access to construct flow data based on the European Labour Force Survey
(Schömann, Kruppe, Oschmiansky, 1998).
21
Table 1: Constitutional provisions for a right to work in the OECD countries.
AUS No constitutional right to work.
CAN New Charter of Rights and Freedoms 1982 Section 6 (2) §b: right to pursue the gaining of a living
in any province, right of mobility more than a right to work.
NZL No constitutional right to work.
GBR No constitutional right; however a restrictive right to work can be seen in particularly acts such as
the Disabled Person Employment Act 1944, the Employment Act 1975, Job seekers’ allowance.M
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USA No constitutional right to work.
IRL Art. 45 (2) of the Irish constitution: provisions without binding obligations for the state.
In
te
rm
ty
pe
 
I
JPN Art. 27 of the Japanese constitution: constitutional provisions guarantee rights for workers and
provide that they should be defined by law in conformity with public welfare.
AUT Federal Constitution: constitutional right to earn a living, implicitly through work.
BEL Art.23 §1 of the Belgian constitution (revised in 1994): norm of public order, to be implemented by
Government action.
DNK Grundlov Art. 75 I: stated as a goal; statement or manifestation without material legal effects.
FIN No constitutional right: till 1995 constitutional right to work as a duty for the government to provide
work for every Finish citizen when needed; 1995 reform of constitutional provisions on
fundamental rights replaced the right to work by a duty for the public power to promote
employment and to strive to guarantee everyone the right to work.
FRA Preamble of the V Constitution (that refers to the Preamble of the IV Constitution, particularly §5):
goal to be reached –if possible- through (active) labour market policies.
DEU No national constitutional right; however constitutions of the 12 laender contain a right to work as a
moral and (legal) fundament for labour market policies.
ISL No information available.
LUX Art. 11 of the constitution of Luxembourg.
NLD Art. 20 of the Dutch constitution: provisions enabling the legislature and the judiciary to give more
content and a legal quality to the right to work.
NOR Art. 110 of the Norway constitution: provision that is not binding the state to provision of jobs.
PRT Art. 59 of the Portuguese constitution: constitution expressly assigns the state with the obligation
to create material conditions needed for the materialisation and safeguard of the right, that is
directly applicable and is binding on public and private entities.
EPS Art. 35 of the Spanish constitution: binds the public powers in its goal.
SWE Art. 1 of Swedish constitution: declaration of aims not binding the state to provision of jobs
Hi
gh
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CHE No constitutional right to work.
GRC Art. 22 of the Greek constitution: duty of the state to protect this right by creating conditions of
employment.
In
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rm
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ITA Art. 4 of the Italian Constitution (together with the duty to work): provision to be implemented
through labour market policies.
CZE Act N0 1/1991 CoL on Employment and Act No 9/1991 CoL on Employment and Competence of
the Bodies of the Czech Republic: implemented through active labour market policies.
HUN Art. 70/B of the Hungarian Constitution: principles have to be realised through labour market
policies.
KOR Art. 32 (1) of the Constitution of South Korea: give a constitutional basis to the legislation
concerning employment security, unemployment insurance and vocational training.
POL Art. 68 of the Polish Constitution: obligation for the state to observe an adequate socio-economic
policy.
MEX No constitutional right to work.
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TUR Art.48 of the Turkish constitution: with the right to work the state has been assigned the duty to
ensuring that everyone receives an equitable share of the national income.
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4 Trends of unemployment in the OECD
The major aspects of unemployment trends dealt with are the levels of
unemployment as well as the composition of unemployment reflecting shares of
unemployed among the young and according to gender. The long-term unemployed
have also been among the policy priorities in many mainly European Union countries.
This latter group of unemployed persons is of particular importance for our
comparison, since unemployment insurance systems and more general welfare state
provisions are two distinct policy responses to what is in principle the same policy
concern of bringing people back to work or avoiding social exclusion caused by
poverty (compare Figure 1 and Figure 2).
Despite the recovery of economic growth in the OECD area since the middle of
the nineties the unemployment rate for the whole area is coming down very slowly.
However, the strong economic performance of some individual Member States has
demonstrated that the employment intensity of growth is still sufficiently high in most
countries that substantial inroads to reduce unemployment rates can be achieved.
The best performing countries in terms of lowering overall unemployment rates are
found within each of the three types of countries identified in the previous section of
this chapter. Among the countries with high level unemployment benefits Denmark
and the Netherlands have achieved the largest reduction of unemployment whereas
the unemployment rate continues to be below 5 per cent in Austria, Luxembourg and
Norway (compare Figure 7).
The medium level countries show all, except for Japan in recent years, a decline
in the unemployment rate comparing levels of unemployment between 1992 and
1998 (compare Figure 8). Australia, Canada, United Kingdom, United States and
Ireland have all succeeded to reduce unemployment during the recent period of
economic growth. It is noteworthy that countries with a high share of active labour
market policy, close to an unemployment protection system as outlined in Section
two of this chapter, have been quite successful in reducing levels of unemployment.
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Figure 7
Unemployment rate - High Level Type-systems
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The countries with unemployment protection systems of a still growing type witness
stable levels of unemployment except Korea and the Czech Republic recently. The
transition economies of Eastern Europe have managed to reduce the unemployment
rate in the late nineties but substantial changes in the regulations and eligibility for
unemployment benefits or employment insurance have been incurred (compare
Figure 9 and appendix 1).
Across the three unemployment protection groups we can identify a trend that
the level of employment protection particularly the tendency to facilitate fixed-term
employment since the middle of the eighties has mainly contributed to increase the
volatility of the labour market, the fast reaction of the labour market to business cycle
effects, rather than contributing to higher overall employment. In the Asian countries,
which have fallen into recession lately, the high provision of employment protection
has at least slowed down or delayed the rise in unemployment.
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Figure 8
Unemployment rate - Medium Level Type-systems
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Figure 9
Unemployment rate - Growing Type-systems
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4.1 Difficulties at labour market entry
To tackle youth unemployment has been high on the political agenda in most
Member States of the OECD (OECD 1998). However, low youth unemployment rates
are still more the exception than the rule throughout the OECD area. Even countries
with a strong economic performance and overall success in reducing the
unemployment rate, like the U.S., Denmark, Ireland and the Netherlands still have a
higher youth unemployment rate than the national average unemployment rate. A
particularly unfavourable evolution for youth has occurred in Finland where the youth
unemployment rate rose from about 5 per cent in 1991 to 25 per cent in 1997 almost
reaching the high level youth unemployment of Greece, Italy, Spain (over 30 per
cent) and France or Poland (about 25 per cent, (compare Figure 10-12)).
Throughout the OECD there seems to be little change in the youth
unemployment rate over the business cycle in most countries highlighting the role of
institutional factors in explaining the transitional labour market from „school to work“
(Shavit, Müller, 1998). The need to move away from the perception of the school to
work transitions as one single transition remains rather urgent. Additionally, the link
between work experience and learning needs to be strengthened throughout the
working life. Therefore, efforts to make life-long learning a reality for larger shares of
employees through new policy initiatives is a widely shared policy response. The
Scandinavian countries have used job rotation models to allow for employees to
participate in further training and unemployed persons to work as substitutes on the
work place.
There is an increasing concern about the fact that high levels and durations of
youth unemployment is dangerous for societal cohesion. Some countries, mainly in
Europe and Japan with ageing populations, have recognised the related issue of
intergenerational equity. High social expenditure for the elderly increased the non-
wage labour costs in many European countries which adversely affect the hiring of
additional employees by firms. At the same time unemployment protection systems
frequently leave out young persons who have not been able to enter the labour
market successfully or on a sufficiently permanent basis. Young employees are most
likely affected by recent changes in employment protection particularly fixed-term
employment (Schömann, Rogowski, Kruppe 1998) which has led to firm’s
employment strategies of “last in first out”. Unemployment insurance systems which
are based on previous contributions also tend to exclude young persons from
unemployment insurance. This accumulates to high risks of social exclusion for
young persons. Possible escape routes from this dilemma have been found in
reinforcing the link of education systems and the labour market as well as in the use
of large scale public job creation schemes targeted on youth.
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Figure 10
Youth unemployment (15-24) - High Level Type-systems
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Figure 11
Youth unemployment (15-24) - Medium Level Type-systems
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Figure 12
Youth unemployment (15-24) - Growing Type-systems
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4.2 Gender selectivity of unemployment
The trend of increasing gaps between male and female unemployment frequently
observed during previous periods of economic recession has been stopped in the
period of economic growth in the late nineties in the OECD. Taking a medium term
perspective we find that in the medium level countries there has been almost no
change in the levels of unemployment for women (compare Figure 13-14) over the
last 15 years. In line with the overall trend in the U.S. female unemployment has
been pushed successfully below 5 per cent in 1997 and 1998.
In the High Level countries there is no clear cut tendency. Women have been on
the loosing side in Austria, Finland, Germany, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland
comparing 1997 with the average rate for the 1980s and early 1990s. But in Belgium,
Denmark, France and Norway we witness an improvement in the unemployment
situation of women recently. It appears that these positive developments are largely
dependent on an overall favourable evolution of unemployment trends in these
countries to the benefit of both women and men.
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Figure 13
Unemployment rate - Women
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Figure 14
Unemployment rate - Women
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4.3 Persistence of long-term unemployment
There are only a few countries in the OECD which have a long-term unemployment
rate (duration of unemployment 12 months and longer) below 20 per cent of all
unemployed persons. These are Canada, the U.S., Iceland, and Norway. On the
other end of the ranking as worst performers in terms of long-term unemployment
figure Belgium, Ireland, Spain and Portugal (compare Figure 15-17). Besides the
effects of generally insufficient labour demand in most countries with high long-term
unemployment (except Ireland where the economy is not booming with high GDP
growth rates), reasons for persistent long-term unemployment can also be found  in
stigmatisation effects of the long-term unemployed. Among all persons in
unemployment the long-term unemployed have the lowest probability to leave the
unemployment register. Long-term unemployment is perceived by many employers
as an indicator for low productivity at previous jobs and a lack of recent work
experience. Therefore, in the job queue for vacancies the long-term unemployed
frequently figure toward the back end of the queue. Additionally the long-term
unemployed are also in competition with those persons out of the labour force like
temporarily inactive persons or new labour market entrants with recently acquired
training and skills.
Based on specifically calculated flow statistics from the European Labour Force
Survey it can be shown that the share of inflows to employment directly from
unemployment reaches only between 30 and 60 per cent of all inflows into
employment in the European Union over a one year period. Mainly inflows from
inactivity have become fairly important. This can also be seen as an indicator for
increasing levels of discouraged job seekers that leave unemployment and especially
long-term unemployment to become inactive and seek labour market re-entry at a
later stage30. The income support for these persons is either through unemployment
assistance or social assistance, but also through other social protection measures
like compensation for ill-health, disability or early retirement. Some displacement of
cost of unemployment protection to other fields of social protection can be observed,
especially in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Finland and Norway (OECD
1998d p.102).
There is a still growing, mainly economic and econometric literature, based on
job search theory which suggests that unemployment benefits prolong
unemployment durations (Atkinson and Micklewright, 1991; Addison and Portugal,
1999).  Much of this evidence, however, neglects that in systems with individual and
employer’s contributions there exist some form of a labour market experience-rated
right to receive benefits unemployment protection to certain levels of maximum
periods of receipt (see appendix 1 for country specific details). A simple cross
country plot of shares of long-term unemployment in overall unemployment and the
length of unemployment benefits or assistance shows little evidence for an overriding
                                           
30 For more details of how these flow statistics were calculated as well as country-specific details see
Schömann and Kruppe (1996).
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and systematic link between benefit duration and shares of long-term unemployed
(compare Figure 18).
Belgium with one of the highest shares of long-term unemployed in the European
Union provides long lasting benefits but Ireland does not and has similarly high levels
of long-term unemployed. On the other end of the scale, the Scandinavian countries
as well as Austria have possibilities for long benefit receipt of unemployment benefits
but very low shares of long-term unemployed. The explanation is to be found in
specific institutional reasons. All of these countries have besides the right to work a
strong obligation to work, as outlined in the previous section of this chapter. In terms
of labour market policies this takes the form of a job offer (mainly in the public sector)
or a place in a training measure before reaching twelve months of unemployment.
These institutional features and the intervention in the sense of prevention of public
employment services is not easy to model and estimate in micro-level analyses of
transition rates from unemployment to employment.
Figure 15
Longterm unemployment (12-months +) - High Level Type-systems
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Figure 16
Longterm unemployment (12- months +) - Medium Level Type-systems
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
Australia Canada New Zealand United Kingdom United States Ireland Japan
in
 p
er
 c
en
t o
f t
ot
al
 u
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
1983
1988
1993
1997
Figure 17
Longterm unemployment - Growing Type-systems
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5 Recent changes of unemployment protection systems in the
OECD
Despite of the substantial variety of unemployment protection systems among the
industrialised countries outlined in chapter 4 the trends that are shaped by recent
changes in the unemployment insurance systems can be expected to point to the
same direction. This is because the financial constrains both for state finance and
unemployment insurance systems became increasingly tight in most OECD countries
during the 90ies.31 Thus, the expected direction of change of the unemployment
insurance systems is characterised by reductions of level and duration of benefit
payment and/or tighter eligibility and work availability provisions.
To verify this hypothesis this chapter is presenting a concise overview of the
main changes in the benefit systems of the OECD countries. In order to approach
this aim systematically five indicators that characterise the main features of the
unemployment insurance system were chosen and the direction of change in each
indicator during the 90ies is estimated. The basis of our estimation is formed by
compiled information on various changes in the unemployment insurance systems in
these countries shown in Boxes 1 to 3. The result of this data reduction technique is
shown in Table 1.
As a first step of the analysis, we will take a look at the direction of change the
indicators are displaying. It can easily be seen that the predominant direction of
change is that of a stricter and tighter unemployment benefit support. This hold true
for most of the indicators in the High level type countries as well as in the Medium
level type countries. On the contrary the countries of the Growing type on most
indicators show a upward development of generosity of unemployment insurance
benefits.32
As the second step of an analysis, we would like to take a closer look at the
countries by evaluating the changes in detail and, wherever applicable, the
contradictory direction of development.
5.1 The high level type
The unemployment insurance systems in the countries forming the High level type
show an clear trend. This hold true especially for the indicators “work availability” and
“eligibility”. In the former none of the countries have eased the regulations, in the
latter, only three of the 14 countries show an upward trend. However the picture
presented by the other indicators is slightly more heterogeneous (Table 2 and Box 1).
                                           
31 compare Schmid, Reissert, 1996, pp. 243.
32 This notion has to be weakened because of data problems in this group of countries.
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Austria, Belgium, Germany, Netherlands, Norway and Spain represent a group
of countries that show a development toward more strictness on all available
indicators. Austria has reduced the replacement rate and tightened the eligibility
requirements, Belgium has tightened both eligibility and work availability regulations
and has relaxed EPL, Germany has lowered the level of unemployment
compensation and has tightened eligibility and work availability provisions, the
Netherlands have reduced the duration of benefit payments, tightened eligibility and
work availability regulations and eased EPL, Norway has reduced the duration of
benefit payments and has tightened eligibility and Spain, while reducing the
replacement rate and tightening eligibility and work availability regulation, has eased
eligibility for agricultural workers in some regions. On the other hand France is the
only country that has (re)tightened their employment protection legislation (EPL)
resulting in an higher EPL-indicator (OECD 1999c:66).
Table 2: Recent changes of the OECD unemployment protection systems (early
90ies to 1998). Sources: OECD Economic Surveys (different countries and years),
OECD 1997b, OECD 1996, European Commission 1995-1998. “–“ indicates that no
further information on changes is available, blank cells indicate that no or insufficient
information is available.
Level Duration Eligibility/
access to
benefit
Work
availability/
Job search
Re-
qualification
Empl.
protection
legislation
(cf. OECD
1999c)
Overall summary:
(direction of change in the
available indicators)
AUS (9 – ; ; – – stricter
CAN ; ; ; ; – – stricter
NZL ; ; ; – stricter
GBR ; ; ; – – stricter
USA (9 ; – slightly stricter
IRL ; ; – stricter
JPN – – – – – no change recorded
AUT ; – ; – – – stricter
BEL – – ; ; – ; stricter
DNK 9 ; ; ; ; stricter
FIN 9 – 9; – ; ; heterogeneous
FRA ;9 ;9 ; – – 9 slightly stricter
DEU ; – ; ; – ; (slightly) stricter
ISL – ; 9 ; – slightly stricter
LUX no change recorded
NLD – ; ; ; – ; stricter
NOR – ; ; – – ; stricter
PRT – – 9 – – ; heterogeneous
ESP ; – ; ; – ; stricter
SWE ; – ; ; 9 ; stricter
CHE ; 9 ; ; – – stricter
GRC 9 9 – – – – more generous
ITA 9 – 9 ; – ; heterogeneous
CZE (; stricter
HUN – ; ; stricter
KOR 9 9 more generous
POL no change recorded
MEX (9 (9 more generous
TUR no major changes recorded
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Box 1: Trends of changes in unemployment insurance systems of High level type
(early 90s to 1998):
High level type
Austria: Reduction of max. benefit level (1993), increase of minimum contribution period to 26 weeks
(1995), reduction of replacement rate from 43% to 36%, tighter eligibility requirements.
Belgium: Suspension of unemployment insurance for the dependent person if long-term unemployed
in two-income households (“Global plan” reform in 1993); tighter work availability and job-
search requirements, restrictions in access to benefits, temporary unemployment schemes
and part-time unemployment programmes were made financially less attractive, longer
contribution periods.
Denmark: Extension of the maximum duration of benefit payments from 2.5 to 5 years, but without
possibility of further extension (1994), tightening of work availability and eligibility provisions,
youth and long-term unemployed are entitled to training, work or work experience program,
longer contribution periods, raise of minimum age of recipients.
Finland: Introduction of new means-tested “Labour market support benefit”, re-qualification options
tightened, earning in subsidised jobs create new eligibility (1994), increase of replacement
rate, longer contribution periods, longer waiting period.
France: introduction of a degressive (1992) benefit system leading to a more generous support in the
first 2 years and a less generous support in year 4 and 5 of the unemployment spell; tightening
of eligibility requirements (1993), tax reduction for low pay earners, longer contribution period,
longer waiting period, strenghening of EPL (1989, 1993).
Germany: reduction of unemployment insurance benefit from 63% to 60% for singles and from 68% to
67% for recipients with dependents and reduction on unemployment assistance levels from
56% to 53% and 58% to 57% res. (1993), tightening of work availability requirements,
tightening of eligibility rules, strenghening of EPL (1999).
Iceland: In 1993 enlargement of unemployment insurance schemes also to non-union employee and
self-employed (1993); duration of unemployment benefits limited to a 5-year maximum; more
stringent conditions on search and training; funding and responsibility for unemployment
services was switched to central government (1997).
Netherlands: Tightening of the conditions for earning-related benefit (1993), tightening work-test
(1996), reduction of duration of unemployment insurance from 2 to 1.5 years, tighter eligibility
requirements, reduction of sick-leave payment, longer contribution period.
Norway: Unemployment insurance has been converted from indefinite income support scheme into
temporary compensation and re-qualification rules were tightened (previous earnings
requirement rose from 75 to 125% of basic amount) (1997).
Portugal: Increased benefit entitlements and enlargement of coverage.
Spain: Enlargement of contribution periods (1993), reduction of the initial replacement rate from 80%
to 70%, tightening of work availability rules but more generous eligibility rules for agricultural
workers in certain regions, benefits were made subject to income tax and social security
contribution, longer contributions periods (1994).
Sweden: Entitlement and obligation for unemployed to participate in training or subsidised work
(1993); since September 1997 the standard rate of compensation has been raised from 75%
to 80% after it has been temporarily reduced to 75% from former 90%, tightening of work
availability and eligibility rules, longer waiting period.
Switzerland: Increase of duration with a cut in replacement rate from 80% to 70% for unemployed
without children (1993); tightening re-qualification rules. Introduction of waiting period, more
stringent definition of "suitable work" (1996); school-leavers have to wait up to 120 days before
being eligible for unemployment insurance; reduction of duration of short time and bad
weather allowance; extension of unemployment insurance duration to 520 days but with
condition to participate in active labour market policy programs (1997).
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5.2 The medium level type
The unemployment insurance systems of the countries forming the Medium level
type show an almost homogenous trend in the direction of a decrease in generosity.
Canada and the United Kingdom and New Zealand can serve as the best examples
for such a development (Table 2 and Box 2). Concerning the employment protection
legislation (EPL), no downward change is recorded because of the already very low
level in those countries.
In New Zealand three of the five indicators show an downward trend. Eligibility
and work availability rules have been tightened and the waiting period has been
extended.
In the United Kingdom a drastic reduction of the duration of unemployment
insurance payments has been introduced. In addition work availability and eligibility
regulations have been tightened.
In Canada, all the indicators except for re-qualification show a downward trend.
This is mostly due to a major change in the Canadian UIS in 1996. The level of initial
benefit payment has decreased, the duration of payment have been shortened and
tighter work availability and eligibility rules are in force. Despite this clear trend there
are also changes that lead to a slightly better situation for some unemployed: a family
supplement has been introduced to improve the financial situation for the
unemployed who have families (see Box 4 for Canada).
A similarly slightly diverse picture is found in Australia. On the one hand we can
report the introduction of tighter eligibility and work availability regulations. On the
other hand the change from a couple or household based principle of calculation the
level of benefits to a more individual principle eases the situation for the non-single
unemployed. This could also be interpreted as a change in favour of families
although this focus is much clearer in Canada.
The disclosure of the underlying trends in the United States unemployment
benefit system is more challenging because of its decentralised and fragmented
nature. At least some US states have increased substantially the maximum and
minimum weekly unemployment benefit level. On the other hand eligibility
requirements and work availability rules have been tightened in most states and the
overall budget frames for unemployment compensations were limited in the long run.
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Box 2: Trends of changes in unemployment insurance systems of Medium level type
(early 90s to 1998).
Medium level type
Australia: Replacement rates for married individuals are calculated independently and reduction of
benefit withdrawals (1995); tighter availability and willingness-to-work requirements, tighter
eligibility rules.
Canada: Reduction of benefit amounts for couples (1993); reduction of initial replacement rate from
60% to 55%, reduction of duration to 45 weeks maximum, hour based calculation of benefit
and decline with frequent use, additional family supplement, “workfare” programs for
employable persons, reduced maximum insurable earnings, tighter eligibility and work
availability rules, longer contributory periods, exclusion of job-quitters from UI (1996).
New Zealand: tightened eligibility requirements, introduction of work-test, lengthen of waiting period,
work availability tightened for single parents if there is no child under 14 years.
United Kingdom: Reduction of unemployment insurance duration from 12 to 6 month, tighter work
availability and eligibility rules.
United States: Further decentralisation: The base periods for determining eligibility for benefits are set
by the state authority, work availability tightened (‘work-fare’ programs and mandatory training
or work regulations).
Japan: introduction of a re-employment bonus.
Ireland: Abolishment of earning-related elements of unemployment insurance (1995), reduction of the
initial replacement rate from 41% to 32%, tighter work availability.
5.3 The growing type
Some exceptions from the decreasing overall trend concerning the generosity of the
unemployment insurance system are found of the group of the Growing type
countries. Starting from a very low level, Mexico and Korea are beginning to build up
an unemployment security system. Reflecting financial constraints, these early
beginnings are very limited, compared to the highly developed unemployment
insurance systems of the High level type countries (Table 1 and Box 3).
In Korea a unemployment insurance system was established in 1995. Its
features are comparably low replacement rates, short duration of benefit payments
and a very low coverage of the working population.
In Mexico, a partial conversion of retirement benefit into unemployment benefit
is possible, opening a possibility to overcome hardship while temporarily
unemployed.
Greece and Italy, belonging to a intermediate Group located between the
Growing type countries and the High level type countries, both show a upward trend
in their unemployment insurance systems.
In Italy, replacement rate of the unemployment insurance system increased
significantly from 15% to about 33% of previous earnings. On the contrary, the
system has become stricter by tightening the work availability and job search
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requirements. Another system of income protection consist of special short-time
allowances and mobility payments, both qualifying the system as more generous as
the low replacement rate is indicating.
In Greece both the level and the duration of unemployment insurance payment
has been increased. Despite this development the replacement rate in Greece is still
very low, qualifying the Greek unemployment insurance system as comparably week.
In contrast to Korea, Mexico, Italy and Greece, the unemployment insurance
systems of the former communist countries Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland a
decreasing trend can be expected, reflecting the transition from a socialistic welfare
system to a market economy. Because of data problems this expectation can not be
verified in an appropriate way. In Hungary duration of benefit payment was cut and
the eligibility provision were tightened, in the Czech Republic the tightening of the
eligibility for social assistance can be reported and in Poland the benefit payments
depend on the level on unemployment in the specific region.
Box 3: Trends of changes in unemployment insurance systems of Growing type
(early 90ies to 1998).
Growing type:
Czech Republic: stricter conditions of eligibility for social assistance (1993).
Hungary: Reduction of duration from two to one year  and eligibility criteria tightened (1993); two-
phase system of benefits was replaced by one-phase (1997); beneficiaries are only allowed to
earn up to half of the minimum wage without loss in benefit (prior the whole minimum wage);
cut of prior unlimited duration of Unemployment assistance to 2 years (1996)
Korea: Introduction of unemployment insurance with very limited coverage (1995).
Poland: Duration of unemployment insurance depends now fully on unemployment rate in area
Mexico: Workers are allowed to use a small fraction of SAR-amount (individual accounts for
retirement) for periods of unemployment, but only after 5 years of SAR- contribution (1992).
Greece: Ease in eligibility condition to get longer unemployment benefits (1989), extension of benefit
entitlements (1991), Unemployment benefit increased (by 30%) family surcharge increased by
20 to 26% depending of number of dependent children (1993).
Italy: Introduction of a mobility benefit for unemployed (1991), basic unemployment benefit was
increased from 15% to 33% of previous earnings, tightening work availability rules, coverage
of benefit has been extended.
5.4 Common trends in unemployment protection systems during the 90s
There has been relatively little change in the countries’ groupings into the three broad
categories of high level, medium level and growing type unemployment protection
systems in the time period of observation. This statement is valid for both aspects of
unemployment insurance, mainly discussed in this section, and in fact employment
protection. Countries achieving budget surpluses (for example the United States) in
recent years have not spent these funds on more generous unemployment benefit
levels or longer durations of receipt of benefits. Similarly, countries under severe
budgetary pressure to curtail public expenditure, like those organised in the
39
European Monetary Union, have cut back their benefit levels and sometimes
shortened the length of benefit payments, but overall the group membership has
been sustained. Probably the group of countries of the growing type systems is most
likely to change in composition, although a strong performance in terms of economic
growth is needed out of which higher levels of benefits could be financed to
accompany rapid technological change or the consequences of the transformation
process in the Eastern European countries.
Despite this stability in the broad developments of the unemployment insurance
systems we have witnessed common trends across the different levels of the three
types of unemployment protection systems as identified at the beginning of this
chapter (figure 3). First, In almost all countries the link between benefit claiming and
demonstration of job search activities by the unemployed and those at risk of
dismissal has been strengthened. A tendency which is likely to reduce the risk of an
unemployment trap, whereby the generosity of unemployment benefits is expected to
prolong the duration of unemployment (Atkinson and Micklewright, 1991; Addison
and Portugal, 1999). Policy reforms which aim at strengthening the insurance
principle within the unemployment insurance system are likely to reduce the risk of
an unemployment trap for those insured, but are at the same time likely to decrease
the coverage of the same system in leaving out new labour market entrants or
persons wanting to enter the labour market out of household activities.
The most far reaching reform of an unemployment insurance system and
towards a system of employment insurance has taken place in Canada since 1996.
The fundamental reform of the unemployment insurance system is scheduled over
five years similar to the French labour market policy reform of 1993 of the Five Year
Plan33. Major institutional change apparently need time to be “digested” by the public
concerned and even longer to be implemented successfully. Two examples of far
reaching reforms are described in more detail in Boxes four and five.
                                           
33 Loi quinquennale relative au travail, à l’emploi et à la formation professionnelle (liaisons sociales
Supplément au numéro 11590 du lundi 27 décembre 1993.
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Box 4: Towards Employment Insurance: The example of Canada
Canada’s new employment insurance (as of July 1996) aims at a radical structural change of the old
unemployment program to move towards an insurance based program (Nakamura, 1996; OECD
1997b). With the enactment of Lloyd Axworth’s Employment Insurance Bill C 12, the Canadian
employment insurance undertakes three important changes, which are genuine innovations aiming at
more fairness in the treatment of participants:
1.
 
Hours of work as the unit of account, instead of using weeks of work, -the minimum qualifying
period for benefits (from 420 up to 700 hours of work) depends on the region’s unemployment
rate-. This switch should help to reverse the erosion of coverage resulting from increasing amount
of employment in part-time jobs, that were ineligible for coverage under the old program rules. It
aims at a greater equity of treatment between part-time and full-time workers.
2.
 
The intensity rule, where the replacement rate for insured earnings falls with increased use of the
insurance over time, is expected to re-establish employment insurance as a social protection
scheme more closely linked to the insurance principles. This is an innovative form of insurance:
instead of raising the premiums in response of recent employment insurance claims of an
unemployed person, the new employment insurance program reduces the level of benefits
provided for those with longer durations of previous claims. When employment insurance benefits
are exhausted after the maximum duration of 45 weeks, workers can apply for full or partial social
assistance which is means tested.
3.
 
The „clawback provision“ makes it possible that unemployed persons with high incomes will repay
part of their benefits through the income tax system. As a consequence of this change well-off
unemployed persons or employees who are laid-off with relatively high annual incomes will repay
greater amounts of the benefits through income tax.
This structural reform of the old Canadian unemployment system tends to facilitate broader coverage,
to better control the costs without more intrusive investigations and regulatory control and to provide a
more even-handed treatment of participants. Thanks to a phase-in strategy the Bill C 12 will have
progressive impacts on the public to enable a greater success of this reform. For example a family
income supplement top-up as of January 1997 until the year 2000 to reach 80 per cent of insurable
earnings.
Second, a number of countries have made increased efforts to disclose unjustified
receipt of benefits among those mainly the Member States of the European Union
although little detailed information is available to what extent these efforts have been
successful or have not just caused substitution effects in the form that a person who
was not eligible for unemployment benefits was claiming social assistance instead.
Still a thorny issue in any evaluation of labour market reforms.
From the perspective of transitional labour markets (Schmid 1998) efforts to
strengthen the link between the different employment statuses of employed,
unemployed and out-of-the labour force is to be welcomed particularly if new forms of
transitions into work are implemented. The trend of enhanced policing of the
unemployed is, however, questionable since it increases the already strong and
inherent tendency of the unemployment insurance systems to be regarded in
isolation from the other social spheres and social safety nets as depicted in figure 2
above.
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Box 5: Labour Market Reform and Activity Contract: Innovations from France.
The French system of employment policies and at the same time those of unemployment insurance
has undertaken a real change of orientation in the 1990s. The main goal is no longer the
indemnisation of special risks in the labour market (for example, age related unemployment or of lack
of qualifications), but much more the political will to act on the total volume of jobs and on job sharing.
The instruments used for this purpose are on one hand the reduction of labour costs through reducing
level of social security contributions and the reduction of working hours to 35 hours a week. On the
other hand the unemployment insurance tends to facilitate the access of (non) workers to education
programs or to new qualifications training by financing those measures with unemployment insurance
funds.
Another aspect of the change in the French employment policies is to acknowledge the modification of
the legal status of the work contract, still largely based on the subordination principle, which is no
longer the common rule in practice. The development of non working activities during the active life,
for example in form of further training or other periods of leave (parental leave, leave for start up of a
enterprise, retraining leave in case of dismissal), requires the adaptation of the legal status of work. An
additional worker status needs to enable the continuation, the addition or even the cumulation of rights
during the non working period. The new legal concept (contrat d’activité), proposed by a report from
the Commisariat général du Plan (1995), directed by Jean Boissonnat, aims at maintaining the
acquired rights while working on a work contract (which could have been of fixed-term or more
permanent duration) or under part-time contracts when employees undertake non remunerated
activities during their life of working age.
The activity contract is not a work contract, but a kind of framework contract in which the worker
negotiates and concludes a „professional“ contract („an employment contract“) with a corporate group
of employers, a (non profit) association, etc. for a minimum duration of 5 years. It guarantees the
worker on the one hand the continuation of a minimum salary and social protection, whilst on the other
hand it allows the possibility to participate in training programs and to harmonise his legal status
through a succession of legal situations within the status of an activity contract. In this case, the
succession of precarious contracts does not tend to increase the risks of general precarity conditions
but permits relatively stable earning conditions. With the new activity contract, the group of employers
has the possibility of adapting the skills of the employees to new needs and gains contractual
flexibility.
There have been only marginal recent changes concerning employment protection.
The reflexivity of changing regulations concerning fixed-term employment if changes
in overall dismissal protection is hard to tackle has been weakened. Mainly the
experience of Spain with persistent high unemployment and youth unemployment
and wide-spread use of fixed-term employment has discouraged other countries from
following this route proposed by the OECD during the 1980s and early 1990s. Some
loosening up of employment protection can be observed but only of a marginal kind,
since employment protection is frequently dealt with in sectoral agreements between
trade unions and employers or in firm-level collective agreements. This has left to the
legislator only a restricted leverage to influence overall trends in employment
protection and mainly in the sense to affect the already less protected non-unionised
part of the labour force.
An interesting development has occurred in Austria and Germany where high
employment protection in form of high levels of severance pay are now increasingly
transformed into active social plans whereby a re-orientation of employees to new
jobs is already pursued with considerable efforts for job search and retraining while
still under contract with the (previous) employer. Additionally, the link between the
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sphere of employment protection and unemployment insurance becomes factual
reality in the case of the labour market reform in Germany (Sozialgesetzbuch III)
where the amount of severance pay is partly taken into account in the calculation of
the unemployment benefits and especially in part-time early retirement.
The recent issue of the Employment report of the OECD in its editorial (1998)
also considers the development of a sound system of employment protection and a
closer link to unemployment insurance as well as social protection at large as an
important strategy to fight social exclusion and persistent poverty.
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6 Conclusion and outlook
In a recent article on the fiscal crises in welfare democracies the eminent scholar
James M. Buchanan (1998, p.14) writes: “The ‘social model’ that many Europeans
hold unemployment protection as superior to the somewhat more limited welfare
states elsewhere is not economically viable for the twenty-first century.” In this
chapter we have not dealt with the implications of welfare state arrangements and
the economic performance of the different types of employment systems. The danger
to social cohesion which originates from the globalisation of the economies has also
been largely ignored. According to the results presented in this chapter the detailed
description and analysis of the many different forms of welfare provisions in OECD
countries including the far reaching and multiple changes already introduced, as well
as in progress, give sufficient reasons to expect a survival of key elements of the
welfare state particularly in the field of protection against unemployment.34
Probably the most interesting development in the OECD countries with respect
to income security concerns the multiple forms of co-financing from different funds,
which means that welfare state arrangements can build on a large societal
consensus which no longer exclusively relies on public funds. Nevertheless, in
countries with high unemployment the unemployment insurance payments still foot
the largest share of the bill. The OECD-wide discussion of activation of passive
labour market expenditure (OECD, 1994a,b; 1997a, b) has also led to rethink both
the financial aspects of income support during unemployment as well as
organisational aspects of policy implementation, like a stronger role of the private
sector in the delivery of active labour market policies and employment services.
Based on the strategy of transitional labour markets (Section 2) we developed a
framework which allows to structure the comparison of the complex financial and
organisational features of systems of unemployment insurance and employment
protection combined into a system of unemployment protection. Only if all relevant
elements of the entire social safety net are included into the comparison as functional
equivalents a country's whole effort in terms of the broad concept of an employment
insurance can be captured. The inclusion of functionally equivalent support systems
into far reaching labour market reforms guards against simple displacement of costs
to other social budgets.
On the basis of a detailed analysis of systems of unemployment insurance and
employment protection presented in Section 3 we identified three broad types of
unemployment protection systems (Figures 3 to 5). Each of these types revealed a
                                           
34 The draft framework agreement between the social partners on non-discrimination between fixed-
term employees and open-ended employment contracts which has been attempted for close to ten
years in the European Union lends also support for a future for unemployment protection
regulation (European Industrial Relations Review Nr. 301 February 1999).
44
considerable stability and consistency in recent policy efforts to reduce fiscal burdens
by, at the same time, preserving key elements of unemployment protection. This
allows the conclusion that systems of unemployment insurance and employment
protection, when analysed jointly, share a strong historical path dependency. Radical
deviations from these paths appear to be difficult to achieve since encrusted in
cultural traditions. But continued reforms of the complex systems of unemployment
protection are needed to adjust to changing economic fundamentals as well as
changing target groups most in need.
Age and gender selectivity in the labour market as a whole and in welfare
provision poses a continued challenge to all areas of social protection. We have only
outlined the major trends in unemployment in section four, but within the scope of this
chapter it was impossible to deal with either the processes at work with cause this
selectivity, and in some instances discrimination, or attempts in the field of social
policies to counter these tendencies. Only rigorous and permanent efforts of
evaluation of social policies in all the fields mentioned will yield early warnings
against market and policy failures.
The issue of regionalisation and decentralisation in the implementation and
financing of unemployment insurance has not been dealt with in much detail (see
appendix I for more information). The trend in most countries favours decentralisation
and regional authorities are willing to accept more responsibility in issues of income
support or active labour market policies decided upon in the regions. In some
countries these developments occurred in line with the abolition of state monopolies
in job placement services and moves from public to private employment services.
In the European Union we witness an increased concern about the high levels of
long-term unemployment. A policy reaction very much in the tradition of an effective
implementation of a right to work for everybody is to be seen in the proposition to
provide job offers of a place on an active labour market policy scheme for the long-
term unemployed after 12 months of unemployment and already after 6 months for
young unemployed persons under 25 years of age. A careful control of potentially
growing public expenditure for such measures is needed, but the example from
Denmark with both job offers and successfully avoiding a public deficit at the same
time indicates that such labour market reforms can be organised as positive sum
games.
Many Member States of the OECD have encountered financial constraints to
finance their social expenditures partly due to demographic factors, like shrinking
birth cohorts or larger middle aged cohorts now reaching retirement age. One escape
route for traditional unemployment insurance systems has been to cut down in
benefit levels or benefit durations. The other chosen alternative (for example in
Canada, see Box 4) is to strengthen the insurance principle which means benefits
are only paid to the level of previous contributions. There are some indications that
strengthening of the insurance principle displaces costs to other social safety net
component, for example health or housing support schemes, without reducing overall
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costs. The advantage of such a strategy, however, is that other parts of the social
safety net will become aware of their co-financing role of what we call a broad
employment insurance system. Through such an evolution of an unemployment
insurance system towards an employment insurance system we consider it a feasible
step to understand employment insurance as a way of financing the ambitious goal of
a right to work for everyone.
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in
g 
w
o
rk
, s
at
is
fie
s 
a 
m
ea
ns
 te
st
; a
lso
 
se
lf-
em
pl
oy
ed
 c
an
 
cla
im
 U
A
41
6 
we
ek
s 
(= 
8 
ye
ar
s) 
of 
co
nt
rib
ut
io
n 
pa
ym
en
t w
ith
in
 la
st
 
10
 y
ea
rs
2.
4 
Si
ze
 a
nd
 
du
ra
tio
n 
of
 U
A
re
gu
la
tio
ns
 a
nd
 
ob
lig
at
io
ns
 fo
r 
re
cip
ie
nt
s 
of
 s
oc
ia
l 
a
ss
ist
an
ce
 d
iff
er
 
su
bs
ta
nt
ia
lly
 
a
cr
o
ss
 th
e 
pr
ov
in
ce
s
Fl
at
 ra
te
 d
ep
en
di
ng
 
on
 s
ta
tu
s,
 4
7,
90
 £
 
pe
r w
ee
k 
(D
M 
13
6, -
) fo
r s
ing
le 
pe
rso
ns
 
ov
er
 2
5,
 m
ea
ns
-
te
st
ed
 a
dd
itio
ns
 
(In
co
me
 of
 pa
rtn
er,
 
ca
pi
ta
l c
an
 
di
sq
ua
lify
), 
u
n
lim
ite
d
u
n
lim
ite
d
be
tw
ee
n 
92
-9
5%
 o
f 
pr
ev
io
us
 
u
n
em
pl
oy
m
en
t 
co
m
pe
ns
at
io
n 
be
ne
fit
, u
nl
im
ite
d,
 
co
nd
itio
ns
 o
f 
el
ig
ib
ilit
y 
ar
e 
ch
ec
ke
d 
ev
er
y 
ye
ar
 
Ap
pe
nd
ix 
1
Se
ite
 3
 v
on
 1
2
Indicator
Australia
Canada
New
 Zealand
U
K
USA
Ireland
Jap
a
n
A
ustria
B
elgium
2.5 Coverage of 
UI/UA: Beneficiary 
rates (7) and 
G
eneral m
inim
um
 
a) 42% (decline 
from
 83%
 in 1990)
a) 59 (1996)
a) 40 (1997) 
a) 69 (1996)
a) 36 (1990, not 
com
parable)
a) 73 (1996)
a) 89 (1996) 
M
inim
ex:  person 
or couple with 
children: BEF 
2.7 Average replacem
ent rate of social assistance benefit in per cent (OECD) (2): a) single person; b) couple no children; c) co
uple 2 children
a) 38 b) 50 c) 71
a) 27 b) 47 c) 54
a) 41 b) 57 c) 64
a) 52 b) 63 c) 76
a) 7 b) 12 c) 49
a) 34 b) 49 c) 70
a) 35 b) 49 c) 72
a) 39 b) 46 c) 59
2.8 Special national 
features
m
eanst-tested 
program
, thus UI-
benefits are in the 
nature of social 
a
ssistance
generosity of UI  
(period of 
entitlem
ent,  
qualifying 
conditions)depend 
on regional 
u
nem
ploym
ent rate m
eanst-tested 
program
, thus UI-
benefits are in the 
nature of social 
a
ssistance
UA (IBJSA) 
paym
ents are on 
the level of SA
UI - and social 
a
ssistance- 
arrangem
ents  
differ according to 
state 
Level of UB is not 
incom
e-related
special funds for 
public service 
em
ployees, 
seam
en, seasonal 
w
o
rkers, day-
labourers
III. Additional indicators
3.1 Strictness of 
EPL index (End of 
80s)(8)
3,2
1,7
0,7
2,3
0,4
2,8
3,7
9,0
10,5
3.2 Proportion of 
fixed-term
 contracts 
in per cent(9)
23,5
8,8
*
6,5
2,2
9,4
10,4
*
5,1
3.3 Trade union 
density 1995 in per 
cent(10)
35,20
37,40
24,30
32,90
14,20
48,90
24,00
41,20
51,90
3.4 Coverage of 
collective 
bargaining (per 
cent)
37
26
11
9
25
(1)
 Periods of training
 leave for unem
ployed persons are included in the total unem
ploym
ent benefit period since 1995.
(2)
 Source: O
ECD (1997): M
aking
 W
ork Pay
.
 Data represent the situation in 1994/1995.
(3)
 Average replacem
ent rate for a 40 year old APW
 (average production worker)
 who has been working
 continuously
 since age 18 one m
onth after the unem
ploym
ent spell.
(4)
 See note 2. Single earner household
,
 1994.
 
 
(5)
 O
EDC (1998b: 100)
(6)
 Source: Schm
id/Reissert 1996
(7)
 Sources: Japan
,
 
 Switzerland
,
 N
orw
ay
 =
 O
ECD (1994b: 188)
.
 USA = Internet. Czeck Republik
,
 H
ungary
 =
 O
ECD Econom
ic Surveys. O
thers: Eurostat 1997
(8) Strictness of employment protection legislation index according to OECD (1994b), for an update, see OECD (1999c)
(9)
 Source: O
ECD  1996
(10)
 Source: ILO
,
 W
orld Labour Report 1997-98.
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oy
m
en
t C
om
pe
ns
at
io
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(U
C)
1.
1 
Ti
tle
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f b
en
ef
it
Ar
be
jts
løs
he
ds
-
fo
rs
ikr
in
g 
Ty
öt
tö
m
yy
sp
äi
vä
ra
ha
 (b
as
ic 
or 
wa
ge
 
re
la
te
d 
be
ne
fit
)
Al
lo
ca
tio
n 
un
iq
ue
 
dé
gr
es
siv
e
Ar
be
its
lo
se
ng
el
d 
sa
la
ry
-re
la
te
d 
"
W
er
klo
os
he
id
s 
Ui
tk
er
in
g"
 (W
W
)
Su
bs
íd
io
 d
e 
de
se
m
pr
eg
o
Pr
es
ta
ció
n 
po
r 
de
se
m
pl
eo
1.
2 
Fi
na
nc
in
g
W
ag
e 
re
la
te
d 
pl
us
 
fix
ed
 m
em
be
rs
hi
p 
co
nt
rib
ut
io
n 
of
 
em
pl
oy
ee
s 
an
d 
se
lf-
em
pl
oy
ed
 to
  
UI
 fu
nd
s,
 
em
pl
oy
er
s 
co
nt
rib
ut
io
n 
(0.
3%
 
of
 w
ag
es
 a
nd
 3
%
 
o
f V
AT
), s
tat
e 
su
bs
id
ie
s 
co
ve
r 
ab
ou
t 8
0%
 o
f 
ex
pe
di
tu
re
s
Co
nt
rib
ut
io
ns
 o
f 
em
pl
oy
er
s 
(19
97
: 
3%
) a
nd
 
em
pl
oy
ee
s 
('9
7: 
1,
5%
); S
tat
e 
fin
an
ce
s 
(ta
xe
s) 
62
,5
%
, e
m
pl
oy
er
s 
32
%
 a
nd
 
em
pl
oy
ee
s 
5%
  o
f 
to
ta
l c
os
ts
. B
as
ic
 
en
tit
le
m
en
t: 
10
0%
 
st
at
e-
fin
an
ce
d
Co
nt
rib
ut
io
ns
 o
f 
em
pl
oy
er
s 
('9
8: 
3,
97
%
) a
nd
 
em
pl
oy
ee
s 
('9
8: 
2,
21
%
 to
 2
,7
1%
); 
in
cr
ea
sin
gl
y 
su
bs
id
ise
d 
by
 th
e 
st
at
e.
 
Co
nt
rib
ut
io
n 
of
 th
e 
em
pl
oy
er
 ('9
8: 
3.
25
%
) a
nd
 
em
pl
oy
ee
s 
('9
8: 
3,
25
%
) to
 th
e 
n
at
io
na
l 
u
n
em
pl
oy
m
en
t 
in
su
ra
nc
e
fin
an
ce
d 
ha
lf 
th
ro
ug
h 
wa
ge
 
ta
xe
s 
an
d 
ha
lf 
th
ro
ug
h 
ge
ne
ra
l 
re
ve
n
u
e
s;
 s
el
f-
em
pl
oy
ed
: s
oc
ia
l 
se
cu
rit
y 
ta
x 
pa
ym
en
ts
co
nt
rib
ut
io
n 
of
 
em
pl
oy
er
s 
an
d 
em
pl
oy
ee
s 
Co
nt
rib
ut
io
n 
of
 
em
pl
oy
er
s 
(0-
14
.1
%
 d
ep
en
di
ng
 
on
 z
on
e) 
an
d 
em
pl
oy
ee
s 
(7.
8%
),  
St
at
e 
su
bs
id
ie
s 
co
ve
rs
 3
0.
7%
 o
f 
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
s
Co
nt
rib
ut
io
n 
of
 
em
pl
oy
er
s 
(4%
) 
an
d 
em
pl
oy
ee
s 
(3,
5 t
o 4
%)
So
cia
l s
ec
ur
ity
 
co
nt
rib
ut
io
ns
 o
f 
em
pl
oy
er
s 
(6,
2%
) 
an
d 
em
pl
oy
ee
s 
(1.
6%
) p
lus
 st
ate
 
su
bs
id
ie
s
1.
3 
Qu
al
ify
in
g 
co
n
di
tio
ns
12
 m
on
th
s 
of
 
m
em
be
rs
hi
p 
an
d 
52
 w
ee
ks
 o
f 
co
nt
rib
ut
or
y 
em
pl
oy
m
en
t (p
art
-
tim
er
s 
34
 w
ee
ks
) 
in
 th
e 
3 
ye
ar
s 
pr
ec
ed
in
g 
th
e 
u
n
em
pl
oy
m
en
t 
sp
el
l
at
 le
as
t 4
 m
on
th
s 
of
 c
on
tri
bu
to
ry
 
em
pl
oy
m
en
t i
n 
th
e 
8 
m
on
th
s 
pr
ec
ed
in
g 
th
e 
u
n
em
pl
oy
m
en
t 
sp
el
l (n
o 
re
qu
ire
m
en
t i
n 
ca
se
 o
f f
irm
's 
cl
os
ur
e)
At
 le
as
t 1
2 
m
on
th
s 
of
 c
on
tri
bu
to
ry
 
em
pl
oy
m
en
t i
n 
th
e 
3 
ye
ar
s 
pr
ec
ed
in
g 
th
e 
un
em
pl
oy
m
en
t 
sp
el
l
em
pl
oy
ee
s:
 a
t 
le
as
t 4
25
 [1
70
0] 
 
ho
ur
s 
 w
or
ke
d 
du
rin
g 
pr
ev
io
us
 1
2 
m
on
th
s 
fo
r 
m
in
im
um
 [fu
ll] 
be
ne
fit
s.
 S
el
f-
em
pl
oy
ed
: 
pr
ev
io
us
 
co
nt
rib
ut
io
ns
 (s
ee
 
2.
) a
nd
 cl
os
ing
 of
 
bu
sin
es
s
at
 le
as
t 2
6 
we
ek
s 
of
 e
m
pl
oy
m
en
t 
du
rin
g 
th
e 
la
st
 3
9 
w
ee
ks
 a
nd
 a
t l
ea
st
 
52
 d
ay
 o
f 
em
pl
oy
m
en
t p
er
 
ye
ar
 in
 4
 o
f t
he
 5
 
pr
ec
ed
in
g 
ye
ar
s;
 
vo
lu
nt
ar
y 
u
n
em
pl
oy
m
en
t/ 
re
fu
sa
l o
f jo
b o
ffe
r 
le
ad
s 
to
 e
xc
lu
sio
n 
fro
m
 b
en
ef
its
al
l in
su
re
d 
pe
rs
on
s,
 a
nn
ua
l 
in
co
m
e 
of
 a
t l
ea
st
 
12
5%
 o
f t
he
 b
as
ic 
am
ou
nt
 (2
94
23
 
NK
r i
n 
19
96
) in
 th
e 
pr
ev
io
us
 y
ea
r (o
r 
pr
ev
io
us
 3
 y
ea
rs
 
av
er
ag
e)
54
0 
da
ys
 o
f 
em
pl
oy
m
en
t i
n 
th
e 
la
st
 2
4 
m
on
th
 p
rio
r 
to
 th
e 
u
n
em
pl
oy
m
en
t 
sp
el
l.
At
 le
as
t 3
60
 d
ay
s 
of
 c
on
tri
bu
to
ry
 
em
pl
oy
m
en
t i
n 
th
e 
la
st
 6
 y
ea
rs
 
pr
ec
ed
in
g 
th
e 
u
n
em
pl
oy
m
en
t 
sp
el
l
1.
4 
W
ai
tin
g 
pe
rio
d
n
on
e
7 
w
or
kd
ay
s 
 
n
on
e,
 e
xc
ep
t i
f jo
b 
vo
lu
nt
ar
ily
 q
ui
t (1
2 
w
e
e
ks
)
3 
w
or
kd
ay
s
n
on
e
Ap
pe
nd
ix 
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ite
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 v
on
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Indicator
Denm
ark
Finland
France
G
erm
any
Iceland
Luxem
bourg
N
etherlands
N
o
rw
ay
Portug
al
Sp
ain
1.5 Rates of benefit 
(initial)
m
ax. 90%
 of 
previous gross 
w
age, ceiling of 
2630 DKr (1997) 
per week (= 1500 
EUR, 3000 DM
 per 
m
onth) 
Basic 
u
nem
ploym
ent 
allowance: ca. 515 
EUR/m
onth in 
1997; Incom
e 
related benefit: 
ceiling of 90%
 of 
the form
er earning. day rate of AUD- 
benefit: 44.4%
 of 
previous day wage 
plus lum
p sum
 (FF 
59,63 in 1997) or 
57,4%
 of previous 
day wage (more 
favourable 
calculation is 
chosen); minimum: 
FF 145,37 in 1997
60 %
 of net wage 
(67% for claimants 
with children),  
??ceiling still at DM
 
4680 (5226) West 
/5900 (Ost)? 
O
ECD 7800 DM
 
(7600 andere 
Quelle)) 
Full basic benefits: 
52729 IKr (nearly 
800$) per month in 
1996 + child 
surcharge (4% per 
child under 18) - 
benefits are 
taxable. (Benefit 
flat level is alm
ost 
equal to the 
negotiated 
m
inim
um
 wage of 
w
o
rkers in 
fisheries)
m
eans-tested
70%
 of last-earned 
w
age
daily rate of 0.2%
 
of the previous 
annual incom
e not 
exceeding NKr 
235.380 in 1996
65%
 of the 
average earning of 
the last year of 
occupation. 
M
inim
um
: level of 
the highest 
m
inim
um
 wage 
level, ceiling: triple 
the level of the 
highest m
inim
um
 
w
age
70%
 of the 
a
ve
rage gross 
w
age of the last 6 
m
onth,
1.6 Duration and 
dynam
ics of 
benefits
up to 60 m
onths; 
over 60: 30 
m
onths; under 25: 
6 m
onths plus 
em
ploym
ent or 
vocational training 
with 50%
 of UC 
guarantee (1)
up to 24 m
onths 
up to 60 m
onths 
depending on age 
and insured 
em
ploym
ent; 
digressive (-15 or 
17%
 every 6 
m
onth until a 
m
inim
um
 rate of 
FF 104,16/day); 
period of norm
al 
rate: 4 to 27 
m
onths; period of 
degressive rate: 4 
to
33
m
onths
6 to 32 m
onths 
depending on age  
and insured 
em
ploym
ent
up to 60 m
onths 
(time spent on 
training or courses 
does not count for 
60 m
onths-lim
it); 
n
o
 dynam
ics
up to 12  m
onths in 
a 24-m
onths 
period; no 
dynam
ics
6 to 60 m
onths 
depending on age 
and length of 
service; flate-rate 
extension at 70%
 
of the m
inim
um
 
w
age for another 2 
years
18 or 36 m
onths 
(the latter if 
previous earnings 
e
xce
ed NKr 
85000) 
depending on the 
age at which the 
em
ployees started 
the job of which he 
got unem
ployed. 
Exam
ples: age of 
30: 15 m
onths, age 
of 40: 21 m
onth.
4-24 m
onths 
depending on 
insured 
em
ploym
ent; 
digressive 
(reduction to 60% 
after 6 m
onths)
a) 70 b) 69  c) 83   
d) 83
a) 63 b) 63  c) 88   
d) 98
a) 67 b) 69  c) 80   
d) 65
a) 68 b) 60  c) 78   
d) 71
a) 69 b) 77 c) 84 d) 
80
a) 66 b) 67 c) 73 d) 
83
35 (gross, not 
com
parable)
a) 72 b) 75  c) 74   
d) 46
1.8 Alternatives to 
regular 
u
n
em
ploym
ent 
co
m
pensation
Training benefits 
for unem
ployed in 
ALM
P m
easures; 
Unem
ploym
ent 
pension for long-
term
 unem
ployed 
aged 60 or over;  
Early retirem
ent 
schem
es (Fund 
financed FNE), 
disability schem
es 
n
ot very strong 
Additional benefits 
to top up the 
u
nem
ploym
ent 
benefits, disability 
pensions and early 
retirem
ent 
schem
es
After exhaution of 
UI-benefits 
u
nem
ployed 
accepting offered 
ALM
P  receive a 
non-taxable 
allowance (nearly 
at  UI-level) 
"Transition 
Allow
ance": 
special fam
ily 
allowance targeted 
on single parents 
in need)
Short-tim
e 
arrangem
ents
1.7 Aver. net replacem
ent rates of benefit (per cent) (1994/95) according to OECD: a) Single person (2)  b) Couple, no children
 initial  c) Couple, 2 children, incl. housing support, initial d) Couple, 2 children, 
incl. housing ben., 60th m
onth of unem
pl.
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n
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A
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w
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SA
: A
lg
em
en
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Bi
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an
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we
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n
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Su
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di
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so
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de
se
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eg
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UA
: S
ub
sid
io
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or
 
de
se
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pl
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2.
2 
Fi
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st
at
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fin
an
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AS
S:
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
R
M
I: 
st
at
e-
fin
an
ce
d
Bu
dg
et
 o
f t
he
 
M
in
ist
ry
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f 
Em
pl
oy
m
en
t a
nd
 
so
cia
l a
ffa
irs
st
at
e-
fin
an
ce
d?
UA
:  
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
SA
: s
ta
te
-fi
na
nc
ed
So
cia
l s
ec
ur
ity
 
co
nt
rib
ut
io
ns
 a
nd
 
st
at
e 
(se
e U
I)
2.
3 
Qu
al
ify
in
g 
co
n
di
tio
ns
 o
f U
A
Ex
ha
us
te
d 
or
 n
ot
 
en
tit
le
d 
to
 U
I. 
Re
cip
ie
nt
s 
ha
ve
 to
 
be
 a
va
ila
bl
e 
fo
r 
w
o
rk
. N
ew
 
en
tra
nt
s 
of
 la
bo
ur
 
m
ar
ke
t: 
wa
itin
g 
pe
rio
d 
of
 3
 m
on
th
 
an
d 
te
st
 o
f m
ea
ns
.
AS
S:
 5
 y
ea
rs
 o
f 
co
nt
rib
ut
or
y 
em
pl
oy
m
en
t w
ith
in
 
la
st
 1
0 
ye
ar
s;
   
   
   
RM
I: 
m
in
im
iu
m
 a
ge
 
25
R
eg
ist
er
ed
 a
s 
u
n
em
pl
oy
ed
, b
ut
 
(a)
 no
t q
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lifie
d f
or 
UI
 o
r (b
) h
as
 
ex
ha
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te
d 
UI
; i
n 
ca
se
 (a
) a
t le
as
t 
15
0 
da
ys
 in
su
re
d 
em
pl
oy
m
en
t i
n 
pr
ec
ed
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ye
ar
m
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im
um
 a
ge
:  
30
 
yr
s;
 o
ffi
cia
l r
es
id
en
t 
in
 L
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. f
or
 a
t l
ea
st
 
10
 y
rs
 in
 p
re
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20
 y
rs
; a
va
il. 
fo
r 
w
or
k 
(80
% 
of 
re
cip
ie
nt
s 
ex
em
pt
ed
 in
 1
99
5 
be
c.
 o
f a
ge
, 
in
ca
pa
cit
y,
 c
ar
in
g 
re
sp
on
sib
ilit
ie
s) 
UA
: a
t l
ea
st
 2
6 
w
e
e
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 o
f 
em
pl
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m
en
t d
ur
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g 
th
e 
la
st
 3
9 
we
ek
s 
   
SA
: o
bl
ig
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to
 
lo
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 fo
r w
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k 
(ex
em
pti
on
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ly 
for
 
sin
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nt
s 
wi
th
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e 
ch
ild
 y
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er
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an
 5
 y
ea
rs
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Em
pl
oy
m
en
t o
f a
t 
le
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t 1
80
 d
ay
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e 
ye
ar
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rio
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al
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te
d 
UI
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UI
 a
nd
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pe
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en
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sp
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l s
ta
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un
em
pl
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Si
ze
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nd
 
du
ra
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of
 U
A
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r u
ne
m
pl
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ed
 
ha
vin
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ex
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te
d 
UI
-b
en
ef
its
: 1
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da
ys
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ll a
m
ou
nt
 o
f  
CL
M
S 
(ca
. 2
0 
EU
R/
da
y 
in
 1
99
7 
pl
us
 c
hi
ld
 g
ra
nt
s;
 
af
te
r 1
80
 d
ay
s 
sa
m
e 
as
 
u
n
em
pl
oy
ed
 n
ot
 
en
tit
le
d 
to
 U
I: 
m
ea
ns
-te
st
ed
; 
u
n
lim
ite
d 
du
ra
tio
n
 
AS
S:
 n
or
 m
al
 d
ay
 
ra
te
: F
F 
80
,0
2 
(ol
d 
u
n
em
pl
oy
ed
: 
FF
11
4,
64
) in
 19
97
; 
du
ra
tio
n:
 6
 m
on
th
s 
re
ne
w
ab
le
; R
M
I: 
FF
 2
50
0 
pe
r 
m
on
th
; u
nl
im
ite
d
53
%
 o
f n
et
 
ea
rn
in
gs
 (5
7%
 fo
r 
re
cip
ie
nt
s 
wi
th
 
ch
ild
re
n),
 m
ea
ns
 
te
st
ed
, u
nl
im
ite
d,
 
co
nd
itio
ns
 o
f 
el
ig
ib
ilit
y 
ar
e 
ch
ec
ke
d 
ev
er
y 
ye
ar
de
pe
nd
in
g 
on
  
ho
us
eh
ol
d 
st
at
us
 
an
d 
ot
he
r i
nc
om
e 
so
u
rc
e
s 
(w
hic
h 
le
ad
 to
 s
ub
st
an
tia
l 
re
du
ct
io
ns
); f
.ex
. 
sin
gl
e 
pe
rs
on
: 
71
.2
%
 o
f l
eg
al
   
 
m
in
im
um
 w
ag
e
UA
: 7
0%
 o
f t
he
 
m
in
im
um
 w
ag
e,
 
m
ax
im
um
 o
f 6
 
m
on
th
s 
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
SA
: 1
00
/ 7
0/
 5
0%
 
of
 m
in
im
um
 n
et
 
w
ag
e 
fo
r f
am
ilie
s/
 
sin
gl
e 
pa
re
nt
s/
 
sin
gl
es
 (a
dd
itio
na
l 
al
lo
wa
nc
e 
up
 to
 
20
%
 c
an
 b
e 
gr
an
te
d);
 un
lim
ite
d 
70
%
 o
f n
at
io
na
l 
m
in
im
um
 w
ag
e,
 
hi
gh
er
 if 
de
pe
nd
en
t 
sp
ou
se
s.
 D
ur
at
io
n 
sa
m
e 
as
 U
I, 
in
 
ca
se
 o
f e
xh
au
st
ed
 
UI
: h
al
f t
he
 
du
ra
tio
n 
of
 U
I.
6 
to
 1
8 
m
on
th
s
Ap
pe
nd
ix 
1
Se
ite
 7
 v
on
 1
2
Indicator
Denm
ark
Finland
France
G
erm
any
Iceland
Luxem
bourg
N
etherlands
N
o
rw
ay
Portug
al
Sp
ain
2.5 Coverage of 
UI/UA: Beneficiary 
rates (7)          
a) 61 (1996)
69 (1996)
a) 44 (1996) RMI: 
2500 FF plus 
housing and fam
ily 
allow
ances
a) 74 (1996)
a) 33 (1996)
a) 50  (75% of 
em
ployed are 
co
ve
red by UC) 
a) 61 (1991, not 
com
parable)
a) 25 (1996)
a) 21 (1996)
2.7 Average replacem
ent rate of social assistance benefit in per cent (OECD) (2): a) single person; b) couple no children; c) co
uple 2 children
a) 65 b) 68 c) 95
a) 61 b) 72 c)100
a) 49 b) 57 c) 65
a) 51 b) 59 c) 59
a) 62 b) 74 c) 80
a) 46 b) 62 c) 83
a) 27 b) 33 c) 46
2.8 Special national 
features
Self-em
ployed are 
included
degressive 
developm
ent of UI 
paym
ents
self-em
ployed 
included, (nearly) 
u
nlim
ited UI-
paym
ents
III. Additional indicators
3.1 Strictness of 
EPL index (End of 
the
80s)(8)
3,25
10,50
9,50
12,00
*
*
7,25
9,75
12,50
11,25
3.2 Proportion of 
fixed-term
 
co
ntracts in per 
cent(9)
12
13,5
11
10,3
*
2,9
10,9
9,4
33,7
3.3 Trade union 
density 1995 in per 
cent(10)
80,10
79,30
9,10
28,90
83,3
43,4
25,6
57,7
25,60
18,6
3.4 Coverage of 
collective 
bargaining (per 
cent)
55
9
82
(1)
 Periods of training
 leave for unem
ployed persons are included in the total unem
ploym
ent benefit period since 1995.
(2)
 Source: O
ECD (1997): M
aking
 W
ork Pay
.
 Data represent the situation in 1994/1995.
(3)
 Average replacem
ent rate for a 40 year old APW
 (average production worker)
 who has been working
 continuously
 since age 18 one m
onth after the unem
ploym
ent spell.
(4)
 See note 2. Single earner household
,
 1994.
(5)
 O
EDC (1998b: 100)
(6)
 Source: Schm
id/Reissert 1996
(7)
 Sources: Japan
,
 
 Switzerland
,
 N
orw
ay
 =
 O
ECD (1994b: 188)
.
 USA = Internet. Czeck Republik
,
 H
ungary
 =
 O
ECD Econom
ic Surveys. O
thers: Eurostat 1997
(8) Strictness of employment protection legislation index according to OECD (1994b)
(9)
 Source: O
ECD  1996
(10)
 Source: ILO
,
 W
orld Labour Report 1997-98.
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Un
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pl
oy
m
en
t C
om
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at
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n 
(U
C)
1.
1 
Ti
tle
 o
f b
en
ef
it
Ar
be
ts
lö
sh
et
s-
fö
rs
äk
rin
g
Tr
at
ta
m
en
to
 
or
di
na
rio
 d
i 
di
so
cc
up
az
io
ne
n
o 
un
em
pl
oy
m
en
t 
co
m
pe
ns
at
io
n 
n
o 
un
em
pl
oy
m
en
t 
co
m
pe
ns
at
io
n
1.
2 
Fi
na
nc
in
g
Em
pl
oy
er
s:
 ta
x 
on
 
w
ag
e 
su
m
; 
co
nt
rib
ut
io
n 
of
 
em
pl
oy
ee
s 
 
(ap
pro
x. 
3%
); 
st
at
e 
su
bs
id
ie
s 
ar
e 
pl
an
ne
d 
to
 b
e 
te
rm
in
at
ed
 u
nt
il 
19
97
Co
nt
rib
ut
io
n 
of
 3
%
 
of
 p
ay
ro
lls
 s
pl
it 
be
tw
ee
n 
em
pl
oy
er
s 
an
d 
em
pl
oy
ee
s
Co
nt
rib
ut
io
n 
of
 th
e 
em
pl
oy
er
s 
('9
7: 
2,
67
%
) a
nd
 
em
pl
oy
ee
s 
('9
7: 
1,
33
%
); s
tat
e 
su
bs
id
ie
s
co
nt
rib
ut
io
ns
 o
f 
em
pl
oy
er
s 
an
d 
st
at
e 
su
bs
id
ie
s
Pa
yr
ol
l t
ax
es
: 
em
pl
oy
er
s 
('9
7: 
3,
2%
) a
nd
 
em
pl
oy
ee
s 
('9
7: 
0,
4%
); A
LM
P i
s 
al
so
 fi
na
nc
ed
 b
y 
th
is 
co
nt
rib
ut
io
ns
sp
ec
ia
l p
ay
ro
ll 
ta
xe
s 
of
 
em
pl
oy
ee
s 
('9
7: 
1,
5%
) a
nd
 
em
pl
oy
er
s 
('9
7: 
6%
) to
 "L
ab
ou
r 
M
ar
ke
t F
un
d"
 
1.
3 
Qu
al
ify
in
g 
co
n
di
tio
ns
12
 m
on
th
 o
f 
m
em
be
rs
hi
p 
an
d 
6 
m
on
th
s 
of
 
co
nt
rib
ut
or
y 
em
pl
oy
m
en
t (7
0h
 
pe
r m
on
th
 o
r 
m
or
e) 
in 
the
 ye
ar 
pr
ec
ed
in
g 
th
e 
u
n
em
pl
oy
m
en
t 
sp
el
l
at
 le
as
t 6
 m
on
th
s 
of
 c
on
tri
bu
to
ry
 
em
pl
oy
m
en
t w
ith
in
 
la
st
 tw
o 
ye
ar
s 
(pe
op
le 
sp
en
t ti
me
 
pr
ev
io
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 to
 
u
n
em
pl
oy
m
en
t i
n 
tra
in
in
g/
 e
du
ca
tio
n 
ar
e 
al
so
 e
nt
itle
d);
 
pr
oo
ve
 o
f "
ap
t-f
or
-
pl
ac
em
en
t",
 
"
a
ct
ive
-jo
b-
se
a
rc
h"
at
 le
as
t o
f 1
25
 
da
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 o
f 
co
nt
rib
ut
or
y 
em
pl
oy
m
en
t w
ith
in
 
la
st
14
 m
on
th
; f
or
 
fir
st
 ti
m
e 
u
n
em
pl
oy
ed
 a
t 
le
as
t1
60
 d
ay
s 
(80
 
da
ys
 e
ac
h 
ye
ar
) 
w
ith
in
 la
st
 2
 y
ea
rs
re
gi
st
ra
tio
n 
at
 
PE
S,
 1
 y
ea
r o
f 
co
nt
rib
ut
or
y 
em
pl
oy
m
en
t i
n 
th
e 
pa
st
 2
 y
ea
rs
 p
lu
s 
1 
ye
ar
 o
f 
co
nt
rib
ut
or
y 
em
pl
oy
m
en
t 
be
fo
re
.
12
 m
on
th
s 
of
 w
or
k 
w
ith
in
  p
re
ce
ed
in
g 
36
-m
on
th
s 
pe
rio
d
at
 le
as
t 3
60
 d
ay
s 
of
 c
on
tri
bu
tio
n 
to
 
in
su
ra
nc
e 
du
rin
g 
pr
ev
io
us
 4
 y
ea
rs
o
n
ly 
wo
rk
er
s 
in
 
fir
m
s 
wi
th
 m
or
e 
th
an
 3
0 
em
pl
oy
ee
s;
 
co
nt
rib
ut
io
n 
to
 U
I 
fo
r a
t l
ea
st
 o
ne
 
ye
ar
; n
ot
 e
lig
ib
ilit
y 
to
 b
en
ef
its
 if
 
vo
lu
nt
ar
y 
qu
it 
m
in
im
um
 3
65
 d
ay
s 
of
 w
or
k 
du
rin
g 
la
st
 
18
 m
on
th
s,
 
in
co
m
e 
be
lo
w 
ha
lf 
of
 m
in
im
um
 w
ag
e;
 
n
o 
m
or
e 
th
an
 o
ne
 
job
 of
fer
 re
fus
al
1.
4 
W
ai
tin
g 
pe
rio
d
5 
da
ys
 (in
tro
du
ce
d 
in
 1
99
6)
30
 d
ay
 if
 
vo
lu
nt
ar
ily
 
u
n
em
pl
oy
ed
n
on
e,
 e
xc
ep
t i
f jo
b 
vo
lu
nt
ar
ily
 q
ui
t (9
0 
da
ys
) 
tw
o 
w
ee
ks
7 
da
ys
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Indicator
Sw
eden
Sw
itzerland
G
reece
Italy
Czech Rep
.
H
ung
ary
Korea
Poland
M
exico
Turkey
1.5 Rates of 
benefit (initial)
80%
 of the last 
gross wage, 
Ceiling of 580 SEK 
per day.
without children: 
70%
 of previous 
gross earnings 
(floor at SF 130 
per day) ; with 
children: 80%
 of 
previous gross 
earnings
Benefit is 
com
posed by a 
basic sum
 of 40%
 
(workers) or 50% 
(employees) of 
previous wage 
level plus a fam
ily  
surcharge of 10%
 
for each 
dependent entitled 
to m
aintenance 
M
in. (1997): 
1803,33 Dr/day 
30%
 of the 
previously (last 3 
m
onth) earned 
w
age; ceiling of 
775 EUR per 
m
onth.
m
axim
um
 
replacem
ent rate: 
60%
, benefits are 
subject to 
relatively low 
ceiling (1,5 times 
M
inim
um
 Living 
Standard) so 
average benefits 
at about 25%
 of 
recipients previous 
earnings
Replacem
ent 
rates vary 
considerably 
between 100%
 for 
w
o
rkers w
ith a 
prior incom
e at the 
floor level of UI, 
(floor =10350 
forint) and 48% for 
those with prior 
w
age at  the UI 
ceiling level 
(ceiling = 20700 
forint)in
1997
50%
 of worker's 
average salary 
during the 
preceding 3 
m
onths (taking 
a
cco
u
nt of taxes, 
replacem
ent rate 
at 55%) 
flat ZI 340 per 
m
onth in 1997 
(more generous in 
a
re
a
s classified as 
distressed or for 
individuals with 
long work tenures)
1.6 Duration and 
dynam
ics of 
benefits
10 - 15 m
onths, 
renew
al possible if 
qualifying 
conditions persist 
(availability and 
intention to work)
up to 17 m
onths 
with m
erely 
passive benefits 
lim
ited to first 5 
m
onths (8/13 
m
onths for 
recipients aged 
over 50/60) further 
12 m
onths under 
condition of 
participation in 
ALM
Ps 
5 to 12 m
onths 
depending on 
insured 
em
ploym
ent within 
qualifying period
6 m
onths (5 
m
onths if 
voluntary 
u
nem
ployed or 
u
nem
ployed 
because of 
lockout)
up to 6 m
onths, 
digressive 
(reduction to 50% 
after 3 m
onths)
up to 12 m
onths 
depending on 
insured 
em
ployem
ent 
1 to 7 m
onths 
depending on age 
and insured 
em
ploym
ent
6 to 18 m
onths  
depending on  
regional 
u
nem
ploym
ent 
rate 
a) 75 b) 81  c) 89   
d) 99
a) 73 b) 77 c) 89 
d) 89
22 (gross, not 
com
parable)
a) 36 b) 37  c) 47   
d) 11
47 (gross, not 
com
parable)
16 (gross, not 
com
parable)
28 (gross, not 
com
parable)
*
1.8 Alternatives 
to regular 
u
n
em
ploym
ent 
co
m
pensation
insolvency 
protection
short-tim
e benefits 
(duration reduced 
from
 24 to 12 
m
onths in 1996); 
bad weather 
allowance 
(reduced from 12 
to 6 m
onths in 
1996)
specific 
u
nem
ploym
ent 
com
pensation for 
se
a
so
n
al w
orkers 
Short-tim
e 
allow
ance (CIG) 
(80% of former 
w
age level, ceiling 
at  EUR 750, paid 
by em
ployers and 
em
ployees 
contrib.) and other 
schem
es (special 
UB, redund. 
paym
ents, 
developem
ent 
funds, work funds, 
early retir., 
disability sc.
Training 
Allowance 
(replacement rate 
up to 70%), early 
retirem
ent
 20%
 (!) of working 
age population 
benefit of other 
labour m
arket 
related benefits as 
parental/ sick-
leave, disability 
and early 
retirem
ent 
program
m
es
[Special re-
em
ploym
ent  
bonus 
(unemployed who 
take up job before 
halfway point of 
their benefit 
duration receive 
50%
 of their 
rem
aining benefit)]
since 1992 
w
o
rkers are 
allowed to use a 
sm
all fraction of 
SAR-am
ount  
(individual 
a
cco
u
nts for 
retirem
ent) for 
periods of 
u
nem
ploym
ent, 
but only after 5 
years of SAR- 
contribution; 
se
ve
ra
n
ce
 pays
Social security net 
directed at form
al 
w
o
rkers covers 
pensions, health 
care, m
aternity 
benefits, 
occupational 
injury, sickness 
insurance and 
disability; 
se
ve
ra
n
ce
 pays
1.7 Aver. net replacem
ent rates of benefit (per cent) (1994/95) according to OECD: a) Single person (2)  b) Couple, no children
 initial  c) Couple, 2 children, incl. housing support, initial d) Couple, 2 
children, incl. housing ben., 60th m
onth of unem
pl.
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su
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fu
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db
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pp
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UA
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 1
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ou
t o
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ca
n
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m
ea
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-te
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co
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 s
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w
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n
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hi
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an
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so
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sc
he
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AS
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ac
co
un
te
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on
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fo
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0.
3%
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f G
DP
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19
94
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Fi
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st
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 s
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5%
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 F
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re
st
 b
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lo
ca
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go
ve
rn
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al
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m
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pe
r m
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ex
ha
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tit
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UI
 
re
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ha
ve
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va
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 m
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ss
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d
Ex
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UI
, 
to
ta
l p
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 c
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ita
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in
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ss
 th
an
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 o
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r f
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r b
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 c
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 c
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2.5 Coverage of 
UI/UA: 
Beneficiary rates 
(7)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a) 69 (1996)
a) 53 (1991, not 
com
parable)
a) 6 (1996)
a) 6 (1996, plus  
approx. 10%
 CIG)
a) about 50% in 
1996 M
inim
um
 
Living Standard, 
for a single:3040 
a) due to tightened 
criteria fall from
 
65%
 in 1992 to 
31%
 in 1994
G
M
I: only for 
those unable to 
w
o
rk 
2.7 Average replacem
ent rate of social assistance benefit in per cent (OECD) (2): a) single person; b) couple no children; c) co
uple 2 children
a) 62 b) 83 c) 100
a) 49 b) 61 c) 66
a) 0 b) 0 c) 11
25 (not 
com
parable)
2.8 Special 
n
ational features
short-tim
e 
allowance 
arrangem
ents 
(CIG) covered 1% 
of labour force in 
1994
UI was not 
introduced before 
1995
no  UI, only 
se
ve
ra
n
ce
 pay, 
u
nem
pl. are 
entitled to m
edical 
ca
re
 (8 weeks 
(minimum)), some 
ALM
P 
program
m
es
no UI, only 
se
ve
ra
n
ce
 pays, 
inform
al sector of 
econom
ie very 
strong
III. Additional indicators
3.1 Strictness of 
EPL index (End of 
the
80s)(8)
8,50
1,75
11,00
14,25
3.2 Proportion of 
fixed-term
 
co
ntracts in per 
cent(9)
13,5
*
10,3
7,3
*
*
*
*
`
*
*
3.3 Trade union 
density 1995 in 
per
cent(10)
91,10
22,5
24,30
44,1
42,8
60
12,7
33,8
42,8
33,7
3.4 Coverage of 
collective 
bargaining (per 
cent)
85
9
(1)
 Periods of training
 leave for unem
ployed persons are included in the total unem
ploym
ent benefit period since 1995.
(2)
 Source: O
ECD (1997): M
aking
 W
ork Pay
.
 Data represent the situation in 1994/1995.
(3)
 Average replacem
ent rate for a 40 year old APW
 (average production worker)
 who has been working
 continuously
 since age 18 one m
onth after the unem
ploym
ent spell.
(4)
 See note 2. Single earner household
,
 1994.
(5)
 O
EDC (1998b: 100)
(6)
 Source: Schm
id/Reissert 1996
(7)
 Sources: Japan
,
 
 Switzerland
,
 N
orw
ay
 =
 O
ECD (1994b: 188)
.
 USA = Internet. Czeck Republik
,
 H
ungary
 =
 O
ECD Econom
ic Surveys. O
thers: Eurostat 1997
(8) Strictness of employment protection legislation index according to OECD (1994b)
(9)
 Source: O
ECD  1996
(10)
 Source: ILO
,
 W
orld Labour Report 1997-98.
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IAppendix 2: Methods to distinguish between the main types of
unemployment benefit systems
Cluster analysis
An appropriate technique to create groups of cases that show similar characteristics
is the cluster analysis. In our study the analysis consists of a maximum of 29
countries (=cases). The reliability of the cluster analysis rises with the number of
cases and decreases with the number of clusters to be created (Norušis 1992).
The following conditions were set in the beginning of the first cluster analysis:
1. restriction of the number of clusters to be created to 3,
2. exclusion of cases with one or more missing values,
3. selection of hierarchical cluster technique (Norušis 1992, 83ff.).
The second restriction reduces the number of countries which are included in the
cluster analysis to 19 cases. The countries are Canada, UK, USA, Ireland, Japan,
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Netherlands, Norway,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Greece and Italy. The result of the
hierarchical cluster analysis is depicted in Output 1.
The hierarchical cluster analysis were computed by using the statistical software
package SPSS®. We used the procedures ‘proximities’ and ‘cluster’ to execute the
calculation. We performed a z-transformation on the four variables to control for their
different scales and as the clustering method we used the linkage between the
groups.
Output 1 shows the 3 clusters. Cluster 2 consists of Canada, UK, USA, Ireland
and Japan. Cluster 1 includes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland. The
cluster 3 is formed by Greece and Italy.
In order to complete our grouping of the countries, we had to undertake a second
cluster analysis. Because of several missing values the exclusion of Turkey, Mexico,
Poland, Korea, Hungary and the Czech Republic are irreversible. But the less
accurate K-Cluster analysis provided by SPSS gives us a chance to align countries
with only one missing value into a cluster analysis. These countries, Australia and
New Zealand could be grouped into the first group of countries by using the
procedure ‘quick cluster’ after performing a z-transformation on the four variables.
Output 2 shows the result of the K-Cluster analysis using SPSS®.
Australia and New Zealand are grouped into the cluster 2, Portugal is sorted into
cluster 3. This result could be interpreted as follows: Portugal has a larger distance
from cluster 1 than the other countries of cluster 1 in Output 1.
II
Output 1: Output 2:
Common characteristics of the three categories
The three clusters and the group of countries that had to be excluded from the cluster
analysis can be described using the four main variables. Comparing the level, the
duration the coverage and the employment protection legislation we distinguish
between three main types of unemployment benefit systems (see Chapter 3):
I. the medium level type (cluster 2),
II. the high level type (cluster 1),
III. the growing type.
This distinction is based on four statistical criteria: the level (LEV) and duration of
unemployment compensation payments (DUR), the coverage of the unemployment
insurance (COV) and the strictness of employment protection legislation (EPL).
Categorising each country we use these four indicators in a cluster analysis. Due to
the lack of information in the category ”Growing Type” we had to take additional
information into account, e.g. the historical background of the unemployment
insurance system and the direction of change on the chosen indicators (see Chapter
5).
  Label     Case      3
  Canada       1      1
  United K     2      1
  United S     3      1
  Ireland      4      1
  Japan        5      1
  Austria      6      2
  Belgium      7      2
  Denmark      8      2
  Finland      9      2
  France      10      2
  Germany     11      2
  Netherla    12      2
  Norway      13      2
  Portugal    14      2
  Spain       15      2
  Sweden      16      2
  Switzerl    17      2
  Greece      18      3
  Italy       19      3
COUNTRY    Cluster       Distance
 Australi         2          1.634
 Canada           2           .918
 New Zeal         2          1.754
 United K         2          1.380
 United S         2          1.314
 Ireland          2          1.027
 Japan            2          1.311
 Austria          1           .576
 Belgium          1          1.364
 Denmark          1          1.163
 Finland          1           .660
 France           1           .768
 Germany          1           .991
 Netherla         1           .537
 Norway           1           .318
 Portugal         3          1.416
 Spain            1          1.863
 Sweden           1           .500
 Switzerl         1          1.586
 Greece           3           .709
 Italy            3          1.295
III
Level of unemployment insurance payments (LEV)
As an indicator for measuring the level of unemployment benefit payments we use
the average net replacement rate of benefits for a single person (as defined by the
OECD1). Data refer to 1994. The scale ranges from 0 (TUR, MEX) to 75 percent
(SWE), no data is available for GRC, AUT, ISL, LUX, PRT, CZE, HUN, KOR, MEX,
TUR, POL => see Appendix I, column I.7. (and I.5).
1. The medium level type is characterised by an average net replacement rate of
less than 60 percent, UB-benefit payments are partly means tested (AUS,
NZL). Thus countries classified as medium level type concerning the level of
unemployment benefit payments are: AUS, CAN, NZL, GBR, USA, IRL and
ITA.
2. The high level type is characterised by a net replacement rate of more than 60
per cent. JPN, BEL, DNK; FIN, FRA, DEU, ESP, CHE, NLD, SWE, NOR do
classify for this category (no data available for AUT, ISL, LUX, PRT but they
are likely to comply with the high level type).
3. Concerning the growing type no data for net replacement rates is available but
probably these rates are rather low (taking the gross rates of benefits into
account) or zero in countries lacking any unemployment insurance systems
(TUR, MEX). Concerning the level of unemployment benefits CZE, HUN,
KOR, MEX, TUR, POL are placed in this category.
Duration of benefits (DUR)
For measuring the duration of benefits the grouping refers to the maximum duration
of UB-payments plus the maximum length of UA-payments if the level of UA-
payments is higher than the level of social assistance (appendix 1, column I.6, II).
1. Medium level type unemployment insurance systems pay benefits for less
than one year (unemployment insurance benefits in AUS and NZL are
unlimited but the unemployment insurance level in these countries equals
social assistance). AUS, CAN, NZL, GBR, USA and JPN fall in this category.
2. Countries disposing of a maximum duration of benefit payment of one year or
more (up to unlimited duration) are marked as high level type systems
concerning the length of unemployment insurance payments: Those countries
are IRL, AUT, BEL, DNK; ISL, LUX, PRT; FIN, FRA, DEU, ESP, CHE, NLD,
SWE, NOR, GRE, HUN and POL.
3. Growing type-systems pay benefits for a maximum of seven months (or lack
unemployment insurance system (MEX, TUR). ITA, CZE, KOR, MEX and TUR
are assigned to this type.
                                           
1 The average net replacement rate is calculated at national average earnings. The model refers to
a production worker being 40 years old and having worked continuously since the age of 18.
Replacement rates are for the first month of unemployment after waiting period have been met
OECD (1997, p.23, table 5).
IV
Coverage (beneficiary rate) (COV)
Coverage describes the proportion of all unemployed that is actually receiving UI-
payments (UB and UA - when level is higher than SA). Unfortunately data for
coverage is rather rare (comparable data is only available for the European Union, no
data for AUS, NZL, ISL, CHE KOR; POL; TUR; MEX) => see table, column II.5
1. UI-systems that cover between 40 and 60 per cent of all unemployed are
classified as Medium Level Types. Those countries are GBR, USA, CAN,
FRA, NLD
2. High Level Type-systems are characterised by a coverage of more than 60 per
cent. ILR, AUS, BEL, DNK, FIN, DEU, and SWE fulfil this criterion.
3. UI-systems with a coverage of less than 40 per cent are counted as growing
type -countries. This applies for JPN, LUX, PRT, ESP, ITA, GRE, and HUN.
(MEX and TUR have a coverage of 0 percent since no unemployment
insurance system exists to our knowledge.
Strictness of employment protection legislation (EPL)
The OECD index of the overall strictness of the employment protection legislation
(EPL) covers different aspects of employment protection legislation such as statutory
notice periods, procedural inconveniences, the level of severance pay and rules
governing unfair dismissal (OECD, 1994, pp. 69-73). The result of this index is a
weighted ranking of the OECD countries covered. The common picture the different
clusters of countries are reflecting is also consistent in respect of the strictness of
employment protection legislation.
The medium level countries are characterised by a low EPL-index. The values
are located between 0.36 (USA) and 3.26 (Australia) with a mean value of 1.65. The
high level type countries are characterised on the average by high values in the EPL-
index with a mean value of 8,81. However the picture in the high level country cluster
is much more divers. The values range from 1.75 in Switzerland to 12.50 in Portugal.
Although the EPL index for Switzerland and Denmark are as low as some of the EPL
indices in the medium level cluster, they are qualified for the high level countries
through their high scores in the level, duration and coverage of their unemployment
insurance systems. In both these countries sectoral agreements particularly in larger
firms provide more extensive EPL.
The Growing Type: additional criteria (cluster 3)
As to the Growing Type we pay attention to an additional criterion: the history of
national unemployment insurance systems. Thus Growing Type countries are
characterised as states where unemployment insurance systems do not yet exist (as
in the case of TUR and MEX), were recently created (KOR) or have undergone sharp
changes due to the transformation process within former socialistic states (CZE,
VHUN, POL). Those unemployment insurance systems are supposed to have still a
frequently changing structure and the direction of development is not predictable (in
contrary to Greece and Italy).
Summary
The following table recapitulates the above classification and pools each country
according to the various criteria and their weighting (see above) into one of the three
categories: I. Medium Level type, II. High Level type, III. Growing type.
LEV DUR COV EPL Cluster
Australia I I I I Type I
New Zealand I I I I Type I
UK I I I II Type I
United States I I I I Type I
Canada I I I I Type I
Ireland I II II I Type I/II
Japan II I I I Type I/II
Austria II II - Type II
Belgium II II II I Type II
Denmark II II II II Type II
Finland II II II II Type II
France II II I II Type II
Germany II II II II Type II
Iceland - II - - Type II
Luxembourg - II III - Type II
Netherlands II II I II Type II
Norway II II - II Type II
Portugal II III - Type II
Spain II II III I Type II
Sweden II II II - Type II
Switzerland II II - II Type II
Greece - II I - Type II/III
Italy I I III I Type II/III
Czech Rep. III III - - Type III
Hungary III III - - Type III
Korea III III - - Type III
Poland III II - - Type III
Mexico III III III - Type III
Turkey III III III - Type III
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